Game Analysis On The Demand Allocation Of Municipal Newly-adding Construction Land

The demand allocation of newly-adding construction land is one of the core tasks of the land use general plan. The distribution amount would have a direct impact on local government’s land supply, economic development and finance revenue in the new land use planning period. All levels of governments will certainly compete for the newly-adding construction land allocatioa How to scientifically and reasonably distribute demand amount is the key and difficult point of the land use general planning. Based on the feasibility analysis, this paper attempted to explore the allocation rule of the newly-adding construction land by some game models, set a case study of Jincheng in Shanxi Province, and had a detailed analysis on the phenomena and laws of the demand allocation. Specific contents and results are as follows:(1) Firstly the paper analyzed the feasibility of game model in the newly-adding construction land allocation, and determined to use "tragedy of the commons",’Prisoner’s Dilemma" rules to analyze the game process among county governments, and apply bargaining model to analysis the game process between municipal government and county government assuming in the view of complete information.(2) This paper had an in-depth study on the horizontal game process between county governments. County governments apply the newly-adding construction land demand only from their own interests, which lead to the "Tragedy of the Commons" phenomenon. Meanwhile the demand allocation of newly-adding construction land is a kind of "zero-sum game", so the county government applying for excessive demand is the only choice under the "prisoner’s dilemma". Finally the paper analyzed and compared the demand application of the different counties in Jincheng.(3) The bargaining model of complete information was used to analyze the vertical demand allocation game process between the municipal government and the county government. We separately established the limited and unlimited bargaining models, and comparatively analyzed the game patience and the late-mover advantage of the limited bargaining model, and the game patience and the first-mover advantage of the unlimited bargaining model. The case study proved the existence of the consumption coefficient, the first-mover advantage of county government and the late-mover advantage of municipal government.(4) Finally, from the perspective of the political achievement evaluation, this paper respectively established the incentive and restraint mechanisms for the county government and municipal government. Through scenario simulations for several assessment mechanism, and the simulation of ideal demand allocation effect, we can see that the land political achievement assessment mechanism would effectively regulate the local government’s rational choice, and ensure the municipal government’s rational demand allocation, which can improve the science and efficiency of the demand allocation.Based on game analysis we had a detailed description about the demand allocation process of newly-add ing construction land, revealed game rules among different governments, and put forward some relevant recommendations:The municipal government should strengthen the function positioning for the county governments, and reduce the probability and degree of the "Tragedy of the Commons" phenomenon; municipal government should increase arable land protection, take some incentives to promote the county government to reasonably apply the demand, and effectively reduce the occurrence of the prisoner’s dilemma; The county government can obtain more benefits by increasing the number of the bargaining game; Municipal and county governments both need effective incentive and restraint mechanisms in the view of land political achievement evaluation, in order to achieve win-win cooperation and balance of interests.