A Study On The Mechanism Of "Bicameral System" Engineering Design Audits For Large-scale Construction Projects

The large-scale construction project is an important symbol to highlight the social economic development status and the national construction capacity. The engineering design is the premise of the project construction. Without the good quality of the engineering design, the construction project can’t be successful. So in order to improve the engineering design quality of the large-scale construction project, it has been an urgent task to carry out the engineering design audit for the large-scale construction project scientifically and effectively.This thesis focuses on the research of the mechanism of the engineering design audit for the large-scale construction project. Following the analysis of the design system and the design audit system for the large-scale construction project, this thesis points out the information asymmetry between the owner and the design institute can reduce the quality and the efficiency of the engineering design audit, due to the auditors’lack of the necessary professional engineering design knowledge.By applying the principal-agent theory, this thesis establishes a game model for the existing engineering design mode of the large-scale construction project, which includes the owner and the design institute. The factors that can affect the degree of the information asymmetry between the owner and the design institute are revealed by explaining the practical significance of the main parameters of the model. The relevant decision-making advice for the owner to engage the design institute is given by analyzing the owner’s agency costs and the optimal incentive contract of the model.This thesis innovatively constructs the "Bicameral System" engineering design audit mode, which includes the design institute and the design audit institute, in order to reduce the information asymmetry between the owner and the design institute. By applying the principal-agent theory, two game models and the corresponding optimal incentive mechanisms are established. The results show that the design audit can effectively reduce the asymmetry information, but the owner’s income can be improved only when the audit effort level reaches a certain degree. At the same time, the higher the degree of information asymmetry and the engineering risk, the greater the need for the "Bicameral system" engineering design audit mode.In order to research the probable collusion in the "Bicameral System" engineering design audit mode, this thesis establishes a collusion game model including the design institute and the design audit institute to obtain the conditions which can lead to the collusion. Further, based on the principal-agent theory, this thesis establishes a modified game model between the owner and the design institute under the condition of the collusion. The improved relevant decision-making advice for the owner to engage the design institute is given by analyzing the optimal incentive contract of this modified model. At last, by applying the collusion theory, this thesis establishes a tripartite game model including the owner, the design institute and the design audit institute under the condition of the collusion. The anti-collusion measures for the owner is obtained by analyzing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the model.