Research On Behavior Analysis And Game Mechanism For Related Party In The Search Engine Marketing Systems

With the development of information technology，search engine marketingemerges as the times require. Now search engine marketing is becoming the mostpopular network marketing under the background of information era and manyenterprises go on a ’gold-rush’ in china. But at the same time, as a new marketingmethod, relevant laws and guidance mechanisms are still rudimentary,so thissystem still exist a great deal of problems, for example, false advertisements werepropagandized, the advertisers can not use SEM in a right way because of shortedbidding strategy, and advertisers’ quality were indistinguishable for netizen. In thissituation, for the normalization of the SEM market, it is has great significance toanalysis the related parts’ behavior and the game mechanism.This thesis set the entire process of search engine marketing as research object,based on the hot research field, extends the research field forward and backward.Three stages was divided, they are qualifications checking, online marketing andoffline selling. Setting game theory and information economics as the basis, thisthesis analyzed the process characteristics, related subjects and the nature betweenthem. Through models the interaction process, the root of false advertising wasdiscussed and then putting forward a new staff incentive mechanisms; theequilibrium price of advertisers was studied and then providing references foradvertisers; the features of advertisers was analyzed then approaching some adviceswhich can facilitate the standardization of Search Engine marketing system. Thespecific conclusions are as follows:(1) At the stage of qualifications checking，pointed out that the essence of thegame between illegal advertisers and search engine service providers is a gamebetween search engine service providers and its first-line agents. This thesis studiedthe current staff incentive method through principal-agent model and found out thatthe current incentive method can not stimulate the staff to monitor enterprisers’quality, conversely it lures the employee to sacrifice quality in order to acquirequantity. The thesis putted forward that the efficiency-related wages should bereplaced by fixed salary, and at the same time, the staff management style should be conservative rather than open.(2) At the stage of online marketing,when the advertisers are bidding for anadvertising position, the advertiser is more confident, the click cost he will pay ismore higher. At the same time, the click cost that an advertiser will pay is affectedby the difference of the scan rate and the click rate which are determined by position,the click cost is proportional to the difference. And on that basis, a new phenomenoncalled node position was proposed.(3) When the advertisers’ marketing range is a specific area, by means ofmodern communication tools the internet users can achieve exchange informationsmoothly at low-cost, at that time the advertisers’ behavior shows the followingcharacteristics: the rate of false advertising is different in different industry:usually,in a industry, if the enterprise can acquire higher profits by selling lowquality products, the rate of false advertising is higher. And, in the same industry, therate of false advertising is different for different enterprise, the enterprise’sdiscount factor is higher, the rate of false advertising is lower.(4) The ideal situation in the search engine market is the low quality advertisersand the high quality advertisers can realize automatic separation, then the netizencan identify high quality manufacturers easily. The thesis analyzed the advertisersbehavior by using the signaling model, found out that the third-party certificationauthorities and the search engine should joint efforts to make the search enginemarket more orderly and realize the separating equilibrium in it.