The Game Analysis Of Reverse Logistics Under The Extended Producer Responsibility

Start the scarcity of resources, many non-renewable resources near depletion, the increasinguse of expensive resources available, as well as increasing the degree of national environmentallegislation and increased awareness of environmental protection and other factors, reverselogistics need to be highly valued. Reverse logistics industry in China is still in exploration,suchas the reverse logistics enterprises lack effective incentive mechanisms and self-regulatorymechanism, followed by low level of specialized technical, information asymmetry and otherfactors lead to business and the public is not interested in reverse logistics, Implementationdifficulties. In such circumstances, how the Government to take measures to properly guide theenterprise to enable government and business win-win will be the development of modernChinese main issues of reverse logistics. In this paper, the introduction of reward andpunishment system does not simply reverse logistics management game model and theintroduction of reward and punishment system of reverse logistics management game model tostudy how the Government to effectively manage reverse logistics enterprises. Paper pointed outthat the management of incentives is not a necessary prerequisite for effective management,lower management costs and improve effectiveness of punishment is a necessary prerequisite foreffective management.The status of implementation of reverse logistics in China, theintroduction of extended producer responsibility system, and the use of game theory, acomprehensive study of how the Government to effectively manage the implementation ofreverse logistics companies, enterprises how to implement government policies and efficientimplementation of reverse logistics.