Font Size: a A A

Game Analysis Of The Elements And Influencing Factors Of Managers Compensation

Posted on:2012-12-03Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y X YuanFull Text:PDF
GTID:2269330398493124Subject:Applied Mathematics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Managers pay important rule in the development process in the modern, who is the business decision-makers and the main perpetrators of the business owner’s management. With the progress of the times, professional manager’s salary management model has became the key link which has an impact on an important part of reform and development of enterprise, related to the business constraints and incentive mechanisms. On the background of new century and market economy, existing professional managers pay management has obviously can’t meet the market requirements of economic development, and it is difficult to mobilize the enthusiasm of the manager, so the existing management mechanisms need to be improved from the concept up to in fact, and introduced more efficient incentive system, so as to embody authentically the true social value and labor value of manager, and bring more benefits for enterprises to achieve business owners and managers win-win situation. This article develops the research and discussion of salary management mechanisms of professional managers by combining the psychological contract and the principal-agent theory to build a more complete and reasonable comprehensive salary management.This paper by using the questionnaire analysis showed that the existing incentives mechanisms based only on principal-agent theory can’t generate sufficient incentives to professional managers, so consider to introduce the psychological contract theory into the salary management system, thorough analysis professional managers’ psychological contract types and their behavioral characteristics, which lay a broader basis of theoretical research and application of psychological contract for the professional managers. While the paper build a new compensation model by exploring the comprehensive influence of the psychological contract theory and principal-agent on the managers’ salary mode, the implementation will inspire managers and their psychological contract closely, there is real incentive problems of managers looking for a more reasonable and realistic theoretical basis for executive compensation incentive mechanism designed to provide new ideas and direction.This paper is arranged as follows:The first part described some of the major topics of the background, purpose, meaning, ideas, structure and main innovation; second part defined the relevant concepts at first, followed a brief review is given to theoretical foundation what professional managers pay based on, put forward that the psychological contract theory is an effective complement to principal-agent theory, and presented relevant points; third part made a concrete introduction to main components of current material salary mode which based on principal-agent theory, proposed improved scheme respectively from the causes, status, currently experiencing major problems and corresponding countermeasures of salary mode; in the fourth part, data based on a questionnaire was analyzed through the SAS software package, the content that the professional managers’ psychological contract involved in was investigated, tested the impact of different factors on psychological contract managers, while discussed the impact of different types on psychological contract of the salary mode and the characteristics of the psychological contract managers, then build an incomplete information dynamic game model instance of owners and managers, obtained the only draw to reach the optimal balance of their conditions; fifth part analyzed a variety of factors what impact managers’ salary based on the previous study, and proposed that the enterprise need to build a new integrated management model according to the personality characteristics of professional managers, given the problems existing and solutions by evaluation.
Keywords/Search Tags:psychological contract, principal-agent, salary management, incompleteinformation dynamic game
PDF Full Text Request
Related items