The Formation Mechanism Of Chinese Traditional"Chamber Of Commerce"

Chinese people’s view of rationality is a process of rational interaction with emotions. When many economic transactions occur, people are always keen to get convenience and benefits facing the acquaintances. However, with the gradual expansion of the range of our social life, people left the original circle of tribal and village, hampering the social interactions with acquaintances. Thus, today, compared to the traditional special principle of communication, universal ethical standards are beginning to dominate more services. So, traditional society has been changing to modern society.Rather than institutional arrangements or generalized morality, relationship is the main factor to engender trust in economic life. Based on interpersonal networks, Chinese traditional ethics has important influence in reciprocal cooperation and social trust. Therefore, this paper selects a view of chamber of commerce to discuss the issue of trust in the market and tries to answer how to rebuild trust among enterprises in economic fields mainly from two aspects for the explanations for the Chinese current moral crisis in the market,.Firstly, we focus on the evolution of chambers from traditional to modern. Compared with foreign chambers of commerce, modern Chinese chambers grew directly out of the traditional guild. Thus, historical survey to the evolution of traditional Chinese chambers has important implications in the construction of modern business associations.Secondly, the paper argues that reciprocal behavior promotes business cooperation mechanisms. Therefore, this paper attempts to analyze the internal collaboration among members in the chamber and chambers’ interactions with the officials from the perspective of economics.Most of the economic actions are deeply embedded in relationship networks. Individual behaviors are solutions of conflicts between economic interests and non-economic benefits after a trade-off between material rewards and reciprocity return. From historical perspectives of moral evolutions, this article combines cultural norms with Game Theory. Under the influence of Chinese traditional ethical values, psychological reciprocity helps chamber members to establish and maintain cooperative relations with emotional support, further reducing the judgment of uncertainty during future interactions. When local officials interact with local businesses, their appropriate and timely policy interventions provide a good external institutional environment for the growth and stability of chambers. The principles of reciprocity contribute cooperation, finally reaching a consensus on economic developments.This paper tries to explore the issue of trust from two aspects:the history of Chinese traditional chambers’developments; the interaction between officials with the chamber of commerce. Specific research work includes the following three ways:First, drawing Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger’, as well as Battigalli and Dufwenberg’ideas, this article builds a psychological utility function considering member enterprises’reciprocity motives for the analysis of Game equilibrium;Second, referring to repeated game models, and study conclusions of Nowak(2006), this article explores the conditions of reciprocity cooperation as an "evolutionary stable strategy" among chamber;Third, in the quote of Shleifer (2010)’study conclusions in the end, the paper gives a brief analysis of the relation between government regulation and social trust, concluding that the government’s regulatory interventions have a significant impact on the trust among enterprises.