The Analysis Of The Network United-guarantee Loans Based On Evolutionary Game Model

In the capital markets, because of asymmetric information, bank lending isfacing four problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, audit costs and contractexecution. These problems make the banks choose not to provide loans to those SMEswho can not provide a guarantee and mortgage, so result in the credit market failure.In this paper, through the establishment of evolutionary game model to prove in thelong-term evolution of the development of the united-guaranteed loans outstandingcontributions to solve the problem of credit market failure. Past research hasdemonstrated that united-guarantee loans played an important role for credit marketfailure.Only a few decades since its birth, because of its astonishing excellence toalleviate poverty with a high repayment rate, united-guarantee loans has attractedwide attention from all sectors. The Governments focus on success of the GrameenBank, including the United States, more than50developing countries and developedcountries to follow, trying to transplant their new credit model.Inspired by Professor Yunus’s united-guarantee lending model, and combinedwith the our actual national conditions, in2007, Alibaba and China Construction Banklaunch an unsecured loans of SMEs lending model with no physical collateralguarantee—the network united-guaranteed loans. Whether this new lending model ofChina’s independent innovation wil success,like a guarantee loan? if it’s successful,and how to improve resource allocation efficiency in capital market, that constitutesthe main purpose of the study this paper.This paper is intended to discuss that wether network united-guarantee loans hasan effect on that can be extensive and moral hazard aspect of capital allocationarycause, and discuss that network united-guarantee loans can effectively avoid the moralhazard problem, so as to ease the credit market failure and how it is to play a role.To this end, from the angle of long-term evolution, UNPROFOR established twomoral hazard models between enterprises to analysis of behavior of investment onproductive activities and horizontal supervision after the enterprises obtain the loans.Model results prove that in the long term general equilibrium, there is the sameconclusion of the short-term united-guarantee loans that the company of "hitchhiking"behaviour can be effectively avoided in the aspect of investment on production activities.So united-guarantee loans "hitchhiking" prevailing theory that existingtheory claims to is wrong.But, in the research of the conduct of horizontal supervision,it is found that conclusions are inconsistent with the united guarantee loan. In the longterm general equilibrium, horizontal supervision behavior of networkunited-guarantee loan has serious problems of moral hazard. So "hitchhiking" prevail.Immediately，from long-term evolution angle，we established a game modelbased on the willing to take the network united-guarantee loan between banks andunited-guarantee individuals.Then we draw a conclusion that network informationdisclosure mechanism in united-guarantee loan model made united-guaranteeindividuals tend to incooperating with banks,that means they are unwilling to get theloan in network united-guarantee approach.This provide a theoretical basis for thereal unpopular situation of united-guarantee loan model.Due to the paucity of researches, the results of this paper will be to play a role ofin the future practice development and follow-up related study on the networkjoint-guaranteed loans.