The Analysis Of Accounting Rent-seeking Of High-tech Enterprises In China GEM Based On Game Theory

As an important part of the multi-level capital market in China, mainly for high-tech enterprises, GEM is to support outstanding SME financing through the listing and thus accelerate its development. However, in the GEM, there are a large number of enterprises which do not have the condition of high-tech. At the same time, as a listed company, these so-called high-tech enterprises have actually occurred lots of accounting rent-seeking activities. Those GEM high-tech enterprises acquire the qualification of high-tech enterprise by accounting information fraud, to obtain government’s policy support, tax incentives and other benefits, even get the convenient conditions for IPO and listed on the GEM. On the other hand, in the capital markets, some GEM high-tech enterprises seriously mislead the investment decisions of ordinary investors by announcing false account statements, to take unjust enrichment. The accounting rent-seeking phenomenon of GEM high-tech enterprise not only threats the interests of investors, but also seriously disrupts the order of the capital markets. Therefore, against this background, research and analysis of GEM high-tech enterprise accounting rent-seeking phenomenon becomes very necessary.Based on the reality and theory, this paper attempts through the combination of theoretical analysis and game model to explore the symptoms and the root causes of the GEM high-tech enterprise accounting rent-seeking, solutions are also proposed.The framework and main content of this paper is as follows:The first chapter introduces the background of this research, research ideas, methods of this research and main contribution.The second chapter is the literature review. It summarizes the main findings of the rent-seeking theory worldwide.The third chapter is the theoretical analysis of accounting rent-seeking and game theory, which specifically addressed the accounting rent-seeking theory, analysis of rent-seeking the meaning of accounting, threats and motivation behind, together with an overview of game theory.The fourth chapter is an analysis about accounting rent-seeking phenomenon of China GEM high-tech enterprises, including the concept of high-tech enterprises and definition. Further proved that it is a common phenomenon of GEM high-tech enterprises accounting rent-seeking, which consists of the accounting rent-seeking of getting the HNTE, accounting rent-seeking enterprises IPO and listing process as well as GEM high-tech enterprise accounting information disclosure process.The fifth chapter includes game theory analysis of GEM high-tech enterprise accounting rent-seeking. Create the accounting profiting game Model of GEM high-tech enterprises and intermediary organizations, regulatory authorities and investors, followed by a comprehensive analysis.The sixth chapter is some suggestions to suppress rent-seeking behavior of high-tech enterprises in China GEM.The seventh chapter concludes the whole article, consisting of main position this article is taking, and some areas that could be approved.The main contribution of this paper would be:(1) Usage of game theory methods to GEM high-tech enterprises accounting rent-seeking analysis, establish the game model of the high-tech enterprises with relevant stakeholders to come to each game subject motives, as well as equilibrium. Based on the equilibrium results, this paper identifies the key factors that affect the rent-seeking corporate accounting.(2) To solve the accounting rent-seeking problem of GEM high-tech enterprises, this paper not limited to accounting recommendations strategies, but also make suggestions from both internal organization and the external market perspectives. By internal and external integration, the accounting rent-seeking behavior could be inhibited.