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Based On The Evolution Of The Tripartite Model Of Futures Investors Rent-seeking Regulation Game Research

Posted on:2016-04-19Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:X L ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2309330464463030Subject:Finance
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years, China’s futures market emerged a large number of rent-seeking, the rent-seeking rent-seeking is the meaning of the term in order to obtain certain economic interests, or to the existing economic interests for their redistribution and engaged in unproductive behavior, essentially belongs to the pursuit of monopoly rent behavior. First of all, the rent-seeking for regulators special "care". Takes time, gift mind, what’s more money to open this aisle, won’t produce any benefits for society and social and economic benefits; Second, the regulatory department in order to prevent the occurrence of rent-seeking behavior, also takes time, manpower and material resources, thus increased the social management cost; Finally, if rent seekers achieved its purpose, and the related producers and consumers will pay due to the intervention of regulators, the sum of the cost than rent-seekers much higher income to economic interests, which leads to the loss of social welfare, so the futures investors rent regulation game theory research has important significance.In this paper, based on the evolution of the three futures investors rent-seeking regulation game is studied. The first chapter is introduction, mainly described the research background and significance of this paper, current research at home and abroad and the research content and methods; The second chapter is the related theory, rent-seeking theory, financial regulation theory and evolutionary game theory as the foundation; The third chapter is introduced in the futures market investors rent-seeking rent-seeking, exchange, futures regulators rent-seeking behavior and rent-seeking, and according to the characters of investors’rent-seeking rent-seeking behavior of tripartite payoff matrix; The fourth chapter is returns to investors and regulators earnings is analyzed, and the group of investors and regulators evolution is analyzed; The fifth chapter is the analysis of stability, and it is concluded that under the condition of different phase diagram of system’s evolution theory, the final judgement conclusion; The sixth chapter is based on three sides game theory model of the regulation of futures investors rent-seeking research relevant conclusions, and the conclusion of research advances in the futures market.
Keywords/Search Tags:game theory, futures investors, rent-seeking activities
PDF Full Text Request
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