The Joint Chiefs Of Staff In The Evolution Of U.S Policy Toward Okinawa(1952-1972)

Among factors that restricted the development of U.S-Japan alliance during the Cold War, the Okinawa problem was at the core and for which the two countries had engaged in diplomacy over 20 years. This paper introduced the main course of diplomatic negotiations between U.S. and Japan and the general evolution process of U.S. Policy toward Okinawa from the sign of San Francisco Treaty of Peace with Japan in 1952 to 1972 when the Agreement between Japan and the United States of America Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands came into effect.This paper consisted of four parts:the first part discussed the major policies that the Joint Chiefs of Staff dealt with the Okinawa problem during 1952 to November 1967. The second part expounded the change of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s policies toward Okinawa since the late period of Lyndon Johnson to November 1969. The third part expounded the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s policies which were aimed at maximizing American military interests in Okinawa after the Nixon administration decided to return Okinawa to Japan. The forth part was the conclusion of this paper. It summarized the implementation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s military advices in U.S. Policy on Okinawa. The core point was that as the major military adviser of American decision making echelon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff played a significant role in making policies toward Okinawa:Its consideration on the first place of Okinawa’s military importance affected U.S. Policy on Okinawa as well as the development of U.S.-Japan alliance, and its divergence and reconciliation with the Department of State constituted the main trail of the evolution of U.S. Policy toward Okinawa. It is the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s military strategic orientation for Okinawa that established the policy foundation of Okinawa still being a significant overseas military base of America today.