Rational Design Of International Climate Institution:Accessing The United Nations Framework Convention On Climate Change

Abstract:Climate change is a global issue reshaping the international political and economic development. I analyzed the establishment and development of the international climate institution and its related problems of rational design. By looking at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, I intended to answer:how was the international climate institution designed the way it is today? What are the features of this institution?I used the methodology of case study and qualitatively probed into the establishment and development of the Convention. This study pivoted on the theoretical analysis of Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, who initiated the discussion of the rational design framework of international institutions. Based on this theory, I looked at independent variables of asymmetry of actors and distribution problem, as well as dependent variables of scope of issues and asymmetry of control. My hypotheses are:(1) scope of issues increases with asymmetry of actors;(2) scope of issues increases with the severity of distribution problem;(3) individual control decreases with the asymmetry of actors.I argue that:the objectives of the rational design of the international institution are not separated from the features of the institution. In the international climate institution, scope of issues increases with asymmetry of actors; scope of issues increases with the severity of distribution problem; individual control is closely correlated with the asymmetry of actors, whereas the relation between the two variables is not in line with the third hypothesis. In the first hypothesis, Parties to the Convention are at different levels of capacity to mitigate climate change and share differentiated responsibility of emission reduction, the consequence of which leads to the emergence of more greenhouse emission reduction plans. Additionally, due to the asymmetrical control of finance, Parties to the Convention support different financial mechanisms. Thus the scope of financial mechanisms expanded. To analyze the second hypothesis, I argue that developed countries and developing countries compromise respectively in the game of reforming the international institution, by expanding the scope of the institution and negotiating related outcomes at climate conferences. As to the third hypothesis, the asymmetry of the actors affects individual control of the institution, which is dynamic and can not be regarded simply as in an increasing or decreasing fashion. I argue that these features are decisive in the design of the international climate institution, and at large these features are the objectives of the design.By discussing the rational design of the international climate institution, I contributed both to the theory and the empirical analysis. Theoretically, I probed into the conjectures of the rational design framework and identified its merits and shortcomings. Empirically, I analyzed the establishment, development and existing problems of the climate institution, and meanwhile provided suggestions to prospective design of this institution from a Chinese angle.