Studies Of Local Governments’ Game Equilibrium In The Process Of Regional Economic Integration In China

With the deepening of integration process of regional economy, local governments use complementary advantages, strengthen cooperation, exploring institutional innovation to promote regional economic integration, aiming at seeking their development. However, in the long-term fiscal decentralization and government performance examination dominated by GDP, the local government pursue the maximization of their own interests as a deeply entrenched interest. Even they will benefit from the regional cooperation of local government, but in the face of economic development, public welfare and official promotion, limited resources in this area will still become the priority among priorities between the local government competition. If things go on like this, the process of regional economic integration will be obstructed. Therefore, study on local governments’ game equilibrium in the process of regional economic integration and promote the integration of regional economy sustainable development are necessary.This article uses the literature analysis method, game analysis research method, empirical analysis and normative to study of local governments’ game equilibrium in the process of regional economic integration. The main research contents of five parts. The first part is introduction, including starting with the necessity of this research from the background and meaning, give necessary instructions to the research methods, possible innovation research content, and the literature review on domestic and foreign scholars make consolidation and review. The second part is the summary of theory, mainly introduces the related concepts and theories of local governments’ game equilibrium in the process of regional economic integration briefly, including the theory of regional economy, local government competition theory, game theory. The third part is the non cooperative game between local government behavior and its consequences. This part begin from the economic repeat construction, investment promotion and capital introduction competition three aspects, to expound the performance and hazard of the local government competition. The fourth part is the game model analysis of local government economic behavior, mainly study on League game models and competition selection model of local government to explain the feasibility of local government cooperation and main influence factors. The fifth part is the conclusion, it is the summarizes and conclusions of this paper. Then, put forward to promote the local government in the process of regional economic integration cooperation.