Study On The Implementation Process Of Supervision Mechanism Of Government Purchase Of Public Services

Principal-agent theory provides a theoretical basis for the government to buy social organization service, principal-agent relationship based on asymmetric information, the objective function is inconsistent and incomplete contract agent risk, government purchase services project implementation process as an important link of project process are more likely to produce the principal-agent risk, at the same time, based on the project implementation process of multilayered principal-agent chain, the project implementation process of supervision become inevitable. According to principal-agent theory, in order to alleviate the information asymmetry, inconsistent interests, and reduce the agent risk, it required to design constraints and incentives. For project implementation process in our country, it needs to build a set of supervision mechanism, and from the regulatory organization management system, running mechanism and system arrangement of three aspects to reduce the risk of agent. However, China’s government purchase social organization service project implementation supervision of regulatory power imbalance, lagging regulation law and regulation means, make supervision results cannot truly reflect. B municipal government has accumulated rich experience in project practice, which is constructed in terms of organization and management of the regulatory system, institutional arrangements and operational mechanisms are universal promotional value. Therefore, implementation of the project need to build a complete regulatory mechanism, In terms of regulatory agencies to establish decision-making, execution and supervision, seting up separation of power system, introducting diversified supervision main body. In terms of regulation, filling the loopholes in contracts, based legal environment and building form a complete regulatory procedures and specifications. In terms of regulatory operation, implementing positive incentives and negative constraints, and to grasp the balance of the incentive and constraint, finally seting up perfect supervision mechanism to overcome information asymmetry, agency risk inconsistent and incomplete contract interest arising.