Reseach On The Principal-Agent Relation Of Chinese Supervisor Responsibility System

As a modern one of the important economic theory, principal-agent theory in recent years is widely used in the field of education, and gradually form a complete research system. Tutor system is our country graduate student train the focal point of reform of the content, to scientific research as the leading tutor system by universities in the university graduate cultivation mechanism reform a top priority. Based on the concrete practice of the tutor responsibility system in our country, the principal-agent theory, based on the theory of property rights theory, contract theory, discusses the tutor responsibility system research to our country.Economic theory is introduced into the graduate student education, the supervisor responsibility system of the principal-agent relationship, from one side reveals the institutional characteristics of university graduate student education and training process. Mentor explained and overall responsibility for the principal-agent relationship in graduate education activities at all levels of the power of the main body characteristic, enumerates the opportunism of management department in colleges and universities, tutors, from the theory and system level to explain the problem of the low efficiency of postgraduate education. Tutor responsibility system of the principal-agent relationship, the inevitable will produce opportunism behavior of agent, means that the client to design and build the corresponding postgraduate incentive constraint mechanism, to circumvent the multi-layer agent opportunism behavior, realize the principal benefit maximization.This paper systematically combed the supervisor responsibility system, the principal-agent relations of the existing research results, to clearly define related concepts, the supervisor responsibility system is divided into five categories of problems existing in the principal-agent relationship, the author believes that the causes of principal-agent problems from two aspects of theory and system are explored. Finally, put forward to enhance the consciousness of the principal-agent contracts, clear relationship in liability; Strengthen the communication between the principal-agent subjects, reducing information asymmetry; Improve the incentive constraints mechanism; Open power system, the internal and external supervision and countermeasures.