Research On Evolutionary Game Of The Purchasing Of Power Supply Enterprises On The Basis Of Life Cycle Cost Theory

Purchasing is a very important part of power supply enterprises, and it is related toenterprise cost management and quality management. Power equipment procurement inthe traditional sense is simply buying and selling of goods, in order to achieve with theleast money to buy the high quality equipment for purchasing target. In recent years, withthe development of power market and the technology, the market demand for electricitycontinues to rise, the competition between power supply enterprises becomes more andmore intense, people gradually regard the power equipment procurement not only as acommodity trading behavior, but as a kind of function which can save cost and realizeprofit.Therefore, the scientific purchase is the inevitable requirement of the sustained andhealthy development of power supply enterprises, and it is also the power source ofbenefit maximization and the optimal LCC of power supply enterprises.Now it seems that from the point of the development speed, structure, quality,benefit of the power supply enterprises, some deficiencies still exist in the procurement ofequipment management in power supply enterprises, such as the fuzzy managementprocurement system, paying attention to procedure too much instead of substance inequipment evaluation, inadequate supervision etc.. In view of this, this paper attempts touse evolutionary game theory to analyze the behavior choose of power companies inprocurement and purchasing departments regulators based on the LCC theory, andanalyzes the principal-agent relationship and evolutionary game model for power supplyenterprises and equipment suppliers, also analyzes the evolutionary game model forpower equipment procurement when taking regulatory authorities into account.It is found that in principal-agent relationship and evolutionary game model forpower supply enterprises and equipment suppliers when the game returns results obtainedthrough the efforts of both players is greater than the cost, then both players will bemotivated to take an positive behavior strategies, gradually reduce the moral hazardequipment procurement. By analyzing the profitable value-added parameters, we find outthat the greater the profitable parameter value is, the more strongly motivation bothplayers have to participate in, which can effectively eliminate the moral hazardphenomenon.It is found that in the evolutionary game model for power equipmentprocurement when taking regulatory authorities into account the proportion of standardizeevaluation of power supply enterprises and the scale of the inspection are affected by penalty coefficients.When the success rate of regulatory authorities inspection is great,after repeated games, regulators will choose the auditing behavior, power supplyenterprises will choose not to standardize evaluation behavior, when the success rate ofregulatory authorities inspection is little, after repeated games, regulators will give upinspection, power supply enterprises will choose not to standardize evaluation behavior.This paper constructs the model of evolutionary game, analyzes the problem ofpower equipment procurement, and puts forward suggestions by strengthening thesupervision system and incentive system etc., hoping to provide reference for the benigndevelopment of the power equipment procurement of power supply enterprises.