A Decision Research In A Dual-channel Supply Chain With Market Segmentation

With the deep development of electronic commerce, electronic marketing channels have been opened on the basis of the traditional distribution channels but channel conflict is incurred. Under this circumstance, the traditional retailers seek breakthrough in the market to promote market competition ability. In terms of existing dual-channel supply chain research, the channel structure is concerned by most scholars while market structure is less noticed. Therefore, dual-channel supply chain optimization decision strategies and its impact on supply chain performance both in terms of channel structure and market structure becomes a problem that needs to be researched and solved.In this dissertation, optimization theory and game theory are used to develop pricing decision models in a dual channel supply chain. Combined with the example analysis, the pricing of the dual-channel supply chain under the circumstances which the retailers open the secondary market on the basis of the primary market is studied, finally the conclusion that the essential conditions for the retailers to open the secondary market is researched.Firstly, the pricing decision models in a dual-channel supply chain are developed on the assumption that the demand is based on pricing. Given the circumstances that the retailers open the secondary market and do not open the secondary market, the conclusion implies that both the optimal system profit of the supply chain under centralized decision and each channel’s optimal profit under Stackelberg decentralized decision increase with the opening of the secondary market. Thus, it conduces to improve the performance of the supply chain when the retailer opens secondary market.Secondly, from the perspective of consumer utility, the consumer utility selection function is built up in the dissertation. The pricing decision models in a dual-channel supply chain are developed on the assumption that market information is prefect. The conclusion implies that the retailer doesn’t open secondary market if only the direct channel exits in the primary market, and it may contributes to achieve Pareto improvement of the profits for the dual-channel members by introduction of the secondary market if demands exit for the two channels under decentralized decision model; secondly, the system profit increase only if demands exit for the two channels and the two markets, and the parameter of acceptance of the secondary market exceeds a critical value under centralized decision model. So, the retailer will open secondary market under special circumstances.Finally, the factor of retailers’ making-decision power is also considered in the dissertation. Giving an idea that the vulnerable retailer should open secondary market following his primary market is proposed. The pricing decision models in a dual-channel supply chain are developed on the assumption that the dual-channel’s potential demands keep same. The conclusion implies that the system profit of the supply chain decreases under centralized decision mode, and both the two retailers’ profits decrease with the secondary market opening, and the crucial factor impacting the vulnerable retailer opening the secondary market is bargaining power. Thus, it will not improve the performance of the vulnerable retailer when he opens secondary market.Through the research above, the conclusion implies that the traditional retailer’s bargaining power is the key impact factors affecting it opening the secondary market.