Dual-channel Supply Chain Optimal Strategies Considering Behavioral Factors

Facing the changeable and competitive marketing environment,many enterprises can't subdue and control the market with a single channel,the combination operation between online and traditional channels is indispensable for enterprises.The question how manufacturer and retailer make decision under this new operation model has attracted wide attention of academic circles.Prior work has mostly focused on the assumption that channel members are complete rationality,neglecting the behavioral factors of channel members.However,behavioral experiments and empirical studies found that social preferences as fairness preference,competition preference,altruistic preference of people exists naturally,and these factors will significantly influence the actual decision-making of channel members.For this reason,in the paper we describe behavioral factors with behavioral operation model,and explore the mechanism of behavioral factors on the decision results under different dual-channel supply chain operation system.The main research contents and innovations include the following four aspects:(1)Within the dual-channel supply chain which comprised of one manufacturer and one retailer,the article develops game models under conditions that retailer holding horizontal competitive preference or retailer has horizontal competitive preference and vertical distributional fairness preference simultaneously,respectively,analyzes the impact of retailer's competitive preference and distributional fairness preference on the equilibrium strategies of one-to-one dual-channel supply chain.The results show that,the preference of retailer's behind aversion and ahead seeking will reduce his bargaining power with manufacturer but will not cause the fierce price competition among channels;the higher level of disadvantageous inequity aversion preference of retailer will change the relationship between ahead seeking preference and supply chain equilibrium results under the retailer-leading supply chain.(2)Within the dual-channel supply chain which comprised of one manufacturer,one online retailer,and one large traditional retailer with price leadership,the study explores the functional mechanism that different fairness preference of large traditional retailer on the equilibrium strategies of one-to-two dual-channel supply chain under the condition of manufacturer adopting differential pricing.The results show that,in the FS model,the vertical distributional fairness and the horizontal peer-induced fairness of large traditional retailer exists interaction effects,and both of them have the opposite impact on the bargaining power of large traditional retailer with manufacturer and the degree of the retail market competition;in the BO model,the effect of large traditional retailer's fairness preference on the bargaining power of him with manufacturer and the degree of the retail market competition is related to consumers'preference for traditional channels.(3)Within the dual-channel supply chain which comprised of one manufacturer with price leadership,one traditional retailer,and one online retailer,the dissertation constructs game models under cases that members' are fairness neutrality,or online retailer has distributional fairness,or online retailer has distributional fairness and peer-regarding fairness,respectively.Moreover,the paper investigates the impact of fairness preference behavior and peer-regarding behavior of online retailer on the equilibrium strategies,and the above effects been further demonstrated under the condition of manufacturer's attitude on online retailer's peer-regarding fairness.The results show that,the effects of online retailer's fairness preference behavior and peer-regarding behavior on supply chain optimal equilibrium results are different,and the online retailer's fairness preference behavior moderates the relationship between peer-regarding behavior and the supply chain optimal equilibrium results.The attitude of manufacturer on online retailer's peer-regarding fairness will change the relationship or the level of it between peer-regarding behavior and the supply chain optimal equilibrium.(4)Within the multi-channel marketing system which contain two competitive brand manufacturers and one retailer,the thesis establishes game models that the traditional retailer with altruistic preference,and the manufacturer takes into account or irrespective of retailer's altruistic preference,comparatively analyzes those models with the model that the retailer without altruistic preference.Furthermore,the paper examines the decision making of supply chain which contains both brand and channel competition,explores the impact of retailer's altruistic preferences on channel member's decision-making and profits.The results show that,in the dual-channel supply chain with brand competition,whether the conclusion of "altruistic preferences is benefit to opposite and hurt oneself" is true or not depends on the level of retailer's altruistic preference and the attitude of manufacturer on retailer's altruistic preference behavior.