Research On Benefit Snatching Of Controlling Shareholders Of Listed Company After Control Transferred

In the corporate governance structure, control the market is an important external governance mechanism. Through control transfer to replace the unqualified management is an important way to solve agency conflict, reasonable control of the transfer is beneficial to promote the perfection of corporate governance, is conducive to the embodiment of the company’s real value, contribute to the realization of shareholders’ wealth maximization and conducive to the healthy development of securities market. Market in the special system background, but the lack of effective regulation, and ownership concentration, the big shareholders have the opportunity to interests of the listed company to make use of a series of activities to grab, empty and listed companiesThis article research Angle of view not only focus on the interests of the controlling shareholders of listed companies to grab, will also be combined with control transfer, transfer control and the delicate relationship. After control transfer, some new shareholders of listed companies through transfer control to the control of the target company. Using the holding position for the purpose of profit, the surface looks, is actually a hollowed listed companies for the purpose to further. Eventually will only rich, poor the listed companies. Study found that many companies before they get a controlling stake in listed companies has been designed after the interests of the grab, coupled with the transfer of corporate governance issues has not been obviously improved after, eventually led to the largest shareholder of Jackie.Based on transfer control, through the discussion of corporate control transfer under the environment of China capital market’s inner drive to explore major shareholders to grab the interests of the behavior of listed companies, and to explore the corporate control transfer in our country and interests action grab is always accompanied by internal and external governance factors. Based on empty warren group, Sichuan Golden Summit (600678) as an example for research. The securities and futures commission in2011through the investigation and trial, Sichuan Golden Summit and warren group according to law on punishment decision. And then external guarantees respectively information disclosure and stock holdings to those responsible for punishment. To gain control of the Sichuan Golden Summit after warren group, its information disclosure problem behind the big shareholders grab behavior in public. Through the survey found that warren group, the initial implementation of Sichuan Golden Summit control its purpose is not to increase the economic benefits of Sichuan Golden Summit, but to benefit. Plus control transfer, the company’s internal and external governance problem is serious, eventually led to the Sichuan Golden Summit hollowed out.Case by introducing the Leshan state-owned assets administration department through the equity transfer, makes the warren group, Zhejiang to implement the control of the Sichuan Golden Summit (600678), and after a series of grab behavior of interests, starting from the control transfer, details the warren group of Sichuan Golden Summit interests means of grab, and from the Angle of corporate governance, analyze why it can easily obtain benefits. And hope that through this case study, can put forward after the transfer of control and preventive measures can effectively prevent the controlling shareholder of the benefit expropriation behavior of listed companies, thus improve the corporate governance of listed companies in our country. From a practical sense, this article also hope that through individual case to come to the conclusion that a general conclusion, mainly on how to prevent such interests grab behavior put forward policy recommendations to relevant department.