The Research On Income Distribution Mechanism Of Land Ticket Transaction Based On Game Theory

The rule of land ticket trading in CQ Rural Land Exchange is one of thecomprehensive reformatory experimental zone for planing urban and rural as a whole，which is a innovative product for exploring construction land of rural collective andurban construction across the region and large-scale replacement.It solves contradictionbetween large number of land in rural idle even abandoned and extremely lack of landfor expansion in urban.After exploring for more than five years， rules of land tickettrading in CQ has now begun to found a way to the function of rural land， and hasopened a new path to support rural，to guarde food arable land，and to optimize landresources in rural and in urban. Under determined revenue of land ticket，the way ofdistribution is the core issue for whether land ticket transaction could be implementedsmoothly in Rural Land Exchange at CQ，which directly related to farmers and ruralcollective economic organizations， central government， local government，landdevelopers and etc.Therefore，the way of distribution will be the most attentive and themost controversial problem after the ticket auction.The main content of this paper is to further improve the mechanism of land tickettransaction.Firstly，it elaborates the substance of land ticket transaction and theformation of ticket revenue.Secondly，it analyses the unknown body，differentposition， unclear property rights，low market-oriented， lax regulation， unreasonableprice and other salient issues and reason to these problems in the process of the auctionbased on comprehensive analysis of transaction status and size in recent sixyears.Moreover， by introducing the Nash balanced game model of economic gametheory and by analyzing of economic interests between various stakeholders includinglocal government and farmers(rural collective economic organizations)， centralgovernment and local government，production region and forthputting region，itdiscusses the optimal choice that each subject itself might take， the optimal gamecombination and optimal conditions for the formation.Fianlly，it proposes specialsuggestion and operational action to safeguard the scientific and rational distribution ofticket revenue according to the result of each subject.