Study On Subsidy Policy Of China’s New Energy Vehicles

In the background global warming and energy crisis, it has become the consensus ofthe world to develop the new energy automotive industry. New energy vehicles will notonly have a huge economic and environmental benefits to relieve the pressure of globalwarming and the energy crisis effectively, but also a main direction of auto industryupgrading and transformation. Consequently, countries, especially developed countriessupport the development of new energy automotive industry vigorously. However, thefactors such as the exorbitant price of new energy vehicles, restriction of the coretechnologies, lack of market demand and so on, leads the industrial scale cannot quicklyform. It is also unable to realize the new energy vehicle s industrialization only rely on themarket mechanism. Therefore, in the beginning of new energy vehicle industry’sdevelopment, financial subsidy policy is very important.This paper focuses on the subsidy policy of new energy vehicle, the purpose is toresearch the new energy vehicles subsidy policy implementation effect and thegovernment’s subsidy tactics, so as to promote the further optimization of the subsidypolicy for new energy vehicles, in order to maximize social welfareIn this paper, firstly, analyzing why subsidy policy is important from the perspectiveof economic theory. Then, using economic theory to describe how to resolve marketfailures by subsidies and analyze implementation effect of new energy vehicles subsidies,for example, analysis of subsidy incidence, analysis of the change of social welfare and theinfluence of new energy vehicles production and sales. After that, by setting the new energyvehicles R&D subsidy optimization Stackelberg model in the view of game theory ingovernment and enterprise, targeted on the maximization of social welfare, using backw ardinduction method to obtain the optimal strategy of the government R&D subsidies,discussing and analyzing the equilibrium price, equilibrium quantity, equilibrium profit ofthe enterprise and social welfare, and then analyzing them in the methods of co mparativeanalysis and empirical analysis; By setting the new energy vehicles price subsidy optimization Stackelberg model in the view of game theory in government and enterprise,targeted on the maximization of social welfare, using backward induction met hod toseparately obtain the optimal policy of the government price subsidies when subsidizingproducers and consumers, discussing and analyzing the equilibrium price, equilibriumquantity, equilibrium profit of the enterprise and social welfare, by using the numericalsimulation and empirical analysis proving conclusions of price subsidy model. At least,according to the corresponding conclusions, putting forward some policy suggestions.