Research On The Subsidy Mechanism Of PPP Project In Urban Rail Transit

PPP(Public Private Partnership)is a partnership between the government and the private sector for interest sharing and risk sharing.PPP mode not only reduces the financial burden of the government and improves the operation efficiency of the public projects,but also reduces the investment risk of the private sector and enhances the vitality of the market economy.Therefore,PPP model is widely used in the field of infrastructure construction and public service.With the development of urbanization in China,the pressure of public transportation in large cities is increasing.Due to the characteristics of high efficiency,low energy consumption and less pollution,urban rail transit has become the priority choice for the government to relieve urban traffic pressure.At the same time,PPP mode can attract the private sector to participate in urban rail transit projects and reduce the investment pressure of the government.Therefore,the urban rail transit PPP project is strongly supported by the government.Due to the large investment amount and high operation cost of urban rail transit PPP project,it is difficult for the private sector to achieve breakeven through the ticket price income,and it is even unable to obtain investment return.The government needs to provide financial subsidies to ensure the stable operation of PPP projects,so as to realize their social and economic benefits.Therefore,how to choose the subsidy mechanism and determine the subsidy price to promote the development of urban rail transit PPP project is the focus of current research.Aiming at the problem of government subsidy for PPP projects,this paper studies how the government gives subsidy prices to the private sector in different subsidy mechanisms.Firstly,the general situation of rail transit PPP projects and the research on government subsidies of PPP project are summarized through literature review.Secondly,the decision-making game models between the government and the private sector under the condition of price subsidy and minimum demand subsidy are constructed.The influence of the government subsidies on the private sector's decision-making behavior is analyzed,obtaining the optimal decision-making solutions of the government and the private sector.Finally,the decision-making behaviors of the two subsidy mechanisms are compared under the case of the same government subsidy amount,and the applicable scope of the two subsidy mechanisms is given.The research shows that under the condition of price subsidy,the charge price of the private sector decision decreases with the increase of the subsidy price,the road capacity and project demand increase with the increase of the subsidy price.Under the condition of minimum demand subsidy,the minimum demand guarantee value of the government decision decreases with the increase of the subsidy price,the charge price of the private sector decision increases with the increase of subsidy price,while the road capacity and project demand decrease with the subsidy price increasing.In the optimal decision situation,the government's social welfare has reached the maximum benefit,but the optimal decision of the two subsidy mechanisms is not the same.Compared with the minimum demand subsidy,the optimal price in the price subsidy is lower,the optimal road capacity and the optimal demand in the price subsidy are higher.However,the subsidy amount given by the government is much higher than the minimum demand subsidy.Under the case of the same government subsidy amount,the government chooses the price subsidy when the market demand is small,the government chooses the minimum demand subsidy when the market demand is large.