Management Power、Compensation Gap Stickiness And Corporation Performance

Along with our country ’s listed company executive compensation disclosure more andmore detailed specification in company’s annual report, we often found some executiveswithin the senior management team unpaid work or get a scenario-in compensation, but thebizarre phenomenon of executive pay also makes the gap between executive compensationand employee compensation shows a tendency of rising. Some studies which related to thepay gap between executives and employees shown that in2010,listed companies in ourcountry internal the pay gap between executive compensation and employee compensation isabsolutely reached681700Yuan, the mean value of the average relative gap is12.83. Amongthem, the relative gap is more than eight times accounted for38.58%of the total, comparewith2004,it’s over nearly sixty percent, so the listed company executives and ordinaryworker’s pay gap appeared the trend of widening. Because of the serious damage to the globalfinancial crisis in2008,the mean of the listed companies’ total amount of profits is droppedby about15%, in China. But executives compensation is not corresponding decline andincreased by about12%,"rich poor temple abbot" phenomenon is often happen.Executive layer’s self-interest motive, the government’s intervention to the enterprise, etc.that make the executive compensation appear "quasi up not down".Compared with therigidity characteristics of average employee compensation, there have the compensationstickiness between executives-ordinary employees. Whether this phenomenon make staffproduce unfair psychology and eventually affect the enterprise’s performance, the currentacademic research have a few about this. In recent years, meanwhile, we realized thatmanagement play a role in corporate governance, the management power as a newperspective to executive compensation incentive problems. Therefore, to study therelationship among management power, salary gap viscous and the corporate performance hasthe very strong practical significance and theoretical significance.In this paper, under the background of China’s special economic system, we study themanagement power of the listed company’s effects to executive-staff ’s compensation gapstickiness and compensation stickiness’s economic consequences. The results show that:(1)Early management of power will significantly increase the listed company’s executive-staff pay gap. (2)Management power will significantly increase the Chinese listed company pay gapcohesive between executives and employee. Compared with the state-owned listed companies,combined with the company’s property rights, management power will significantly increasepay gap cohesive between executives and employee.in non-state-owned listed companies.(3)The relationship between executives-employees’ pay gap stickiness and the company’sperformance has a significantly negative correlation. At the same time, management powerwill strengthen the negative effect between the executives-employee compensation gapviscous and corporate performance.