Research On The Incentive Mechanism Of PMC Mode

Along with the rapid development of economic construction, more and more large-scale construction projects come into being, the owners due to their lack of capacity need to hire a professional project management contractor to help them manage the project, PMC mode arises at the historic moment. In PMC mode, the owner entrusts a PMC contractor to manage the project and with the PMC contract at first; Second the PMC contractor directly signs the contract with the construction contractors (Obtain the owner’s consent and confirmation); Meanwhile the construction contractor and the corresponding professional subcontractors signs the subcontract with the subcontract project. At this point, the owners, PMC contractors, construction contractors and subcontractors forms a three-level principal-agent relationship, the success or failure of PMC mode largely depends on the PMC contractor, construction contractor and subcontractor’s level of effort and the efficiency of cooperation, how to implement effective incentive mechanism of principal-agent relationship at all levels is essential.Scholars did not discuss the problem under the PMC mode of complete three-level principal-agent chain and consider the impact on incentive intensity levels when there are competitions between subcontractors.Based on the above analysis, the main contents of this paper are the following aspects:1. the relevant literature and research status on PMC mode and principal-agent theory are reviewed, combined with PMC mode operation in practice, the results of the deficiencies of the existing research, propose further research ideas and technical route of this article, meanwhile identify the main research; 2. The related theory of PMC mode situations are analyzed, including its complete organization, scope, advantages, disadvantages and the moral hazard problems of the parties; 3. According to the assumptions, construct the three-level moral hazard model under PMC mode, by solving the model, analyze the influencing factors and mechanism of excitation intensity ratio of the adjacent levels; 4. On the basis of Chapter 3 model, by introducing two homogenous subcontractors and competitive relationships between them, building a new three-level moral hazard model to study the similarities and differences between two levels of incentive intensity ratio on whether or not considering the subcontractor competition, meanwhile analyze the degree of competition impact on client final benefits at all levels.Based on the three-level principal-agent chain under the PMC mode in the actual.By analyzing the influence factors and mechanism of excitation intensity ratio in adjacent levels when considering the subcontractor competition or not. To optimize the design of the related incentive mechanism, this paper has a certain practical significance.