Study On Game Yheory Ofcore Stakeholders For PFI Model On Infrastructure

In recent years, with the rapid development of social economy in our country, the increasing demand of infrastructure construction, to reduce the pressure on urban infrastructure construction, government departments to improve the construction of public infrastructure projects. Due to a shortage of financial fund for government departments, to resolve the debt crisis, local governments at all levels with the help of private capital strength, through the way of joint venture or contract to infrastructure projects outsourced to the private sector or a private consortium. In numerous private agent mode, compared to other models, PFI model of operating mechanism more flexible, full of agent system, so the risk is bigger. In view of the PFI model the advantages and disadvantages, the analysis of the PFI model between different interest subjects based on principal-agent relationship and agency problems, studied the core game of stakeholders and to establish the incentive constraints.In this paper, based on the summary of PFI model and definition of PFI mode core stakeholders; Analyzed the specific contract from the contract types; On the basis of the benefits and risks of two factors, this paper expounds the PFI model in the interests of the principal-agent relationship between the principal and agent violations, "negative", "rent-seeking" and so on. On this basis, in relation to the problem of effective regulation to build the government and the PFI project company, the two groups of project management unit and contractor supervision game; In view of the PFI model in two "rent-seeking" behavior, constructed the PFI project corporation and contractor rent-seeking tripartite game, gives the optimal behavior of the three strategies, build the project management unit and contractor "rent-seeking" tripartite game, put forward the effective measures to prevent rent-seeking from the Angle of the government. In order to guide the behavior of the agent, avoid violations, "rent-seeking" risk problem, ensure the efficient and effective operation of the project, realize the maximization of the overall interests of the project, the paper in the fifth chapter from the perspective of the government to establish the core stakeholders incentive constraint.Considering how to lead to overall interests, the agent behavior on the incentive constraints mechanism,respectively from the optimal incentive contract mechanism, reputation incentive mechanism, supervision and restraint mechanism, the paper decides to make analysis of constraint mechanism. On the optimal incentive contract mechanism design, this paper puts forward the design of the optimal incentive coefficient, risk distribution, three aspects of the control of the excitation intensity of advice; Part in reputation incentive mechanism, it is suggested that the government set up the agent’s list of outstanding reputation enterprise library, using the reputation formation agent self-discipline; Constraints, the use of supervision and restraint mechanism and institutional constraints mechanism, this paper argues that perfecting the laws and regulations, combined with the specific item special supervision and market supervision is the long-term effective constraint; Through this part of the research, for the long-term and stable development of PFI model core stakeholders provides practical reference.