A Research On Rent-Seeking Of The Enterprise Budget Management

As an effective means of internal management in the enterprise, budget management has fully played the function of control, coordination, motivating etc. But it is deeply headache to the enterprise managers that the budgetary slack and the manipulation of performance rising from the budget management. Actually, the inefficient enterprise budget management is due to the rent-seeking behavior of agents all levels in the enterprise. That is to say, in the process of budget management, agents often adopt rent-seeking behavior to pursue the interest of their own or their department at the expense of undermining the efficiency of enterprise budget management.This thesis puts the theory of principal agent and corporate governance in a unified research system based on the framework of rent-seeking theory; builds a clearer logical route for the research, and deeply analyzes the rent-seeking behavior in enterprise budget management. Beginning with the definition of rent of enterprise budget management, the author puts forward its content and the essential characteristics. Then under a precondition of the internal principal agent relations, the author analyzes the relationship between enterprise budget management participants on the basis of Game Theory; the author builds two models to analyze the rent-seeking mechanisms, decision-making process and the influencing factors, then discusses the reasons and consequences caused by rent-seeking in enterprise budget management. At last, the author puts forward the correlative measures to governance the rent-seeking behavior of the enterprise budget management according to the conclusions of the preceding analysis.After analysis, the author finds out that viewing from the procedures of enterprise budget management, rent of the enterprise budget management is mainly made up of rent of budgetary slack, rent of budgetary adjustment and rent of budgetary examination. These rents have the characteristics of uncertainty, destructiveness, high-risk etc. The intensity of supervision, punishment costs, probability of rent-seeking exposure and appropriate incentive mechanism are the significant factors which may influence the rent-seeking behaviors. It is hard to recognize for the clients and has great harm to the enterprise if the rent-seeking behavior of collusion between the agents is ulterior in the process of rent-seeking.