Research On Supply Chain Decision-making And Coordination Considering Different Behavior Of The Members

Much research shows that the existing marketplace can not be completely explained bytraditional economics based on perfect rationality. In recent years, it is obvious that thescholars pay more attention to behavioral characteristics of the players. Behavior of theparticipants not only impacts the single link in supply chain, but also affects the stability of thesupply chain as a whole. As we know, supply chain management (SCM) is one of the mostimportant strategies for the firms. Therefore, it is of great significance both theoretically andpractically to study the impact of members’ behavioral characteristics on theirdecision-making and supply chain coordination. Applying theory of SCM, game theory, andbehavioral economics, this paper investigates three classic behavior, fairness concern, trust andoverconfidence, and explores the supply chain decision-making and coordination based ondifferent behavior of members.Chapter3present a supply chain coordination model with both the supplier and theretailer fairness concern, considering the wholesale price contract and revenue sharing contract,respectively. For the wholesale price contract, it is shown that the supply chain coordinationcan not be achieved, in spite of the retailer’s order quantity under both sides fairness concernis higher than that under fairness neutral scenario. In addition, the study indicates that bothretailers’ and supplier’s ideal wholesale price decreases with the degree of fairness concern.For the revenue sharing contract, the supply chain can be coordinated when the certainconditions are met. Chapter4analyses the trust behavior between the supply chain members by developing aStackelberg game model. This Chapter considers trust under self-interest, reciprocity andaltruism scenarios, respectively. It is found that the higher the cost and the degree of trust forsupply chain partners are, the more possibie is their successful cooperation. Furthermore, themanufacturer’s altruism benefits the cooperation in supply chain whereas it is contrary for theretailer’s altruistic behavior. If the manufacturer is full altruistic and the retailer is fullreciprocity, then the Pareto optimal can be achieved.In chapter5, by incorporating overconfidence coefficient into a supply chain, atheoretical model of one supplier and one overconfident retailer is established. According tothe retailer’s market information, this study considers favorable information and unfavorableinformation scenarios. Firstly, we explore the overconfident retailer’s decision-making undernon-buyback contract and show that overconfidence can promote supply chain coordination.Then, as a comparsion, the supply chain with buyback contract under the same conditions isinvestigated. It is demonstrated that the buyback contract fails to work under unfavorableinformation and the supply chain can not be coordinated. However, there is a substantialincrease in retailer’s order quantity under favorable information. Finally, by introducing therevenue sharing contract, supply chain coordination can be achieved.Chapter6gives a brief conclusion, summarizes the theoretical contributions and thelimitations of this paper and points out the future research direction.