The Study Of Third-pary Payment Supervision Based On Game Theory

In21st century, with the innovation and development of Internet technology, Driven bythe development of e-commerce, the third-party payment companies comes to a thrive.Payment and settlement system is the infrastructure of financial markets, put another way,almost all the financial transactions rely on the payment system to carried out smoothly. Thethird-party payment companies rely on its convenient transaction processes and constantinnovation capability, obtained high customer experience and high recognition, and solved theproblem of trust between buyers and sellers in the transaction process, greatly promoted thedevelopment of electronic commerce. Compared to traditional payment settlement, both thedevelopment of innovation and technology. The third party payment have shown significantadvantages features and gradually changing the way of people live. In the year of2013,third-party payment transactions reached5.9666trillion, an increase of56.9%, but comparedto2010and2011more than90%growth rate, the growth is slowing down, showing that thethird-party payment market competition becomes more intense.Along with the development of third-party payment, more payment should be paid to therisks posed by the rapid development. In the early stages of the development of any new thing,there will be some defect or even security risk. As a new combination of the Internettechnology and the financial industry, the third-party payment is also no exception. At present,the regulation to the third-party payment market s still in the exploratory stage of exploration,and the relevant laws and regulations are not perfect, the specific implementation details haveyet to be further improved. Compared to the rapid growth of third-party payment market, ourexisting regulatory system appear to be a bit behind schedule. Some unfair competition occursfrequently, such as third-party payment market’ illegal behavior of credit card, customerinformation leaks and others. The existence of the phenomenon of unjust enrichment, not onlyobstruct the conducive to the healthy development of the market for third-party payment, butalso hindered the development of China’s macro economy.Firstly, the article analyzed the existing regulatory model of third-party payment and regulatory effects, pointing out deficiencies of the existing regulatory system, and points outthe reasons for inadequate supervision by introducing evolutionary game model, based on theconclusions of the Game target, the article designed a serise regulatory framework tothird-party payments and propose appropriate regulatory proposals.The thesis is divided into five chapters:The first chapter is an introduction. Explains the background and significance of thewriting of this paper, and summarized the research status at home and abroad for thethird-party payment market regulation, and points out the thesis research ideas, innovationsand shortcomings.The second chapter is the theoretical basis. Mainly expounded the theory of thethird-party payment regulatory necessity and game theory, provides a basis for furtherresearch on theory.The third chapter mainly analyzed the existence of third-party payment potential risksand existing regulatory model. First, this chapter analyzed the third-party payment’ existingoperating mode, pointing out that there exits network technology risk, precipitation fundingrisk, operational risk, innovation risk and disclosure of customer information under thecurrent operating modeThen separately from the regulatory body, regulatory content, regulatory model, laws andregulations and other aspects, analyzed the deficiencies of the current regulatory system.The fourth chapter is the difficulty of this article. By setting up the game modelaccording to performance previously proposed by the regulation of third-party payment,analyzed the reasons for the current regulation’ defect.Firstly, set up the game model between the third-party payment agencies, pointed to theneed for regulation of third-party payment, followed by the use of evolutionary game model,analyzed the relationship between the regulatory agencies and the third-party paymentmechanism, pointing out that the current lack of regulation the main reason lies in inadequatesupervision, higher regulatory costs, asymmetric information, and proposals some idea toimprove third-party payment model according to the game conclusion. Chapter V combining the relevant conclusions of the study to previous regulatory andgame theory, and designed a new regulatory framework, to ensure the healthy development ofthe third-party payment industry. In addition, it’s also need to further clarify the central bankas the main regulatory authorities, and the coordination of the regulatory regime, establish asound legal system, strengthen the supervision of payment and settlement process of thebusiness, gradually achieved the transform to functional regulation by agency-type regulatorymodel.