Study On Land Expropriation Compensation Based On The Perspective Of Farmers Interests

In the new situation of reform and opening up, with the rapid development of social economy, a lot of land resources are needed in the construction of national economy, leading to the increasing demand for construction land, land in suburban and rural has been brought into the urban and industry economy developing plan, also, a large amount of farm land has been expropriated and exploited. The conflict of interest in the process of land expropriation is getting grim. Acquisition farmers’ interests can not be guaranteed. Therefore, to explore the interests of landless farmers problems in the process of land expropriation, to understand the living conditions of acquisition farmers at present stage in our country in the process of land expropriation, to analyze reason of acquisition farmers’ benefit lost, to find out the source of the conflict of interest between the subjects of land expropriation in the process of land requisition.From the perspective of interests of landless farmers, this paper research on the problems existing in the process of land expropriation, using questionnaire and the household survey. In this paper, 7 typical villages of the Tacheng city and 2 typical villages were selected for field investigation. In the course of the investigation, we issued a total of 165 questionnaires, of which 150 valid questionnaires, and visited the relevant local government departments, gained a large number of first-hand information, so as to ensure the authenticity and reliability of the data. From farmers’ actual situation, by analyzing the statistical data, the paper explored the Tacheng city in the process of land expropriation, and uses game theory model to resolve the government and farmers’ behavior choice, to explore the root cause of the conflict in the process of land requisition land between subjects. The results showed that in the game between local government and central government does not exist pure strategy Nash equilibrium, but mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Under the mixed strategy, the probability of weather the central government choosing supervision is related to fines strength and the extra profit after the local government violations land acquisition is investigated. Namely, the higher the amount of fines, the greater the probability of the local government land acquisition, the lower the probability of the central government choosing supervision; The greater the extra profit the local government obtains after illegal land expropriation, the more probability that the central government will choose to supervise. In the process of the game between the local government and the landless farmers, when the landless farmers do not maintain their own interests, the possibility of illegal land expropriation phenomenon will be greater. In the game of land requisition in the process, the local government in the process of land expropriation in strong position need to change, land acquisition procedures should be standard so as to enable local governments from land value-added income the profit change as the facilitator of economic development, is the legitimate rights and interests of farmers whose land has been maintained, and improve in the process of land expropriation of local government and farmers’ willingness to cooperate, in order to alleviate social contradictions. On the basis of this, the countermeasures and suggestions for protecting the legitimate interests of farmers are proposed for the results and problems of land expropriation.