Decision Making And Coordinating Of Supply Chain With Both Supply And Demand Uncertainty Under Risk-pooling

Modern day supply chain become more and more lean as global sourcing, inventory suppressing and outsourcing is widely applied, which also make the supply chain more and more fragile when facing emergencies such as strikes, natural disasters, equipment failure, terror attack. By the mean time, on the other end of supply chain—market, consumer demand tend to be more and more diversified. These two things put many supply chain into supply and demand uncertainty simultaneously, which make the management of supply chain more and more subtle. Noticing this, both managers and researchers try to figure out how make right decisions under multi-uncertainty. To answer the above questions primarily, we use three chapters which are described following, respectively.First Introduce multi-suppliers which have supply default risk into the classical newsvendor model and analysis the supply chain’s procurement and pricing problem when it faces both up and down stream uncertainties. Discuss the vertical game between retailer and suppliers about order quantity and wholesale price and horizontal game between suppliers about wholesale price. The reliability of unreliable supplier and its marginal failure cost’s priority when the newsvendor making its procure decision and the implication of these two factors to the behavior of the supply chain members are discussed. Finally we use a computational example to illustrate the conclusions made in this paper and the feasibility of the model.Design three payment protocols which different on the way they sharing supply and demand risk are discussed, then Five classical supply contracts: wholesale price contracts, returns policies or buy-back contracts, revenue sharing contracts, wholesale price flexibility policies, quantity flexibility contracts be discussed under both supply and demand uncertainty faced by a two-echelon chain which consisted of one supplier and one retailer. As it shown in this paper, all the contracts can coordinate the supply chain under random supply and demand except wholesale price contracts. Further more, the payment agreements between members of the chain do not have any impacts on the effect of contracts on supply chain, but they do impact the optimal parameters of the contracts under which the supply chain is coordinated.To show the Implication of risk sharing on the decision making and performance of retailer, supplier, DSC in the supply chain which face both supply and demand uncertainty simultaneously, then performance of retailer, supplier, DSC is evaluated under both relative and absolute index to perform comparative analysis, the conclusions show that retailer and DSC prefer demand risk sharing protocol, supplier prefer supply risk sharing protocol. Further, coordination mechanisms for protocols are designed, respectively and sensitivity analysis of the mechanism and its parameters is performed, all these coordination mechanisms are disruption immune. Finally the model and conclusions draw from it are verified through numerical experiment when the demand is uniformly and normally distributed.