Study On Recycling Modes And Coordination In Closed-loop Supply Chain For Electronic Products With Differetial Price

With the rapid development of technology and economy, electronic products are becoming more and more personalized, diversified and fast updating. At the same time, the government has gradually promoted the development of green circular economy with people’s increased awareness of protecting the environment. Under the above double pressure, electronic products enterprises to carry out the recycling of waste electronic products business is imminent. However, production from traditional supply chain management just studies the forward process of material to customer, without considering the treatment of used waste products. The closed-loop supply chain(CLSC) system of the electronic products manufacturing industry, which is composed of the forward supply chain and reverse supply chain, provides a solution for the sustainable development of resources, environment and economy. Therefore, it is very important to study the CLSC of waste electronic products. Given this, the paper is based on the CLSC system of electronic products, using the game theory and contract design theory which are applied to study the CLSC of electronic products, aiming to give guidances of the design of the government and the CLSC members. The main research contents are summarized as follows.(1) The paper outlines three recycling modes of CLSC for electronic products, including electronic product manufacturer recycling mode, electronic product retailer recycling mode and third-party recycling mode. Based on the assumption that the different price of the new electronic products and the remanufacturing electronic products, we use the game theory to study the differential pricing strategy and the corresponding profit of the CLSC for the electronic products in three different recycling modes, and further compare the CLSC model of the electronic products under different recycling modes. It shows that the recycling effort cost coefficients in different recycling modes are different, they have an impact on electronic products manufacturers profit, and thereupon affect the manufacturers’ choice of recycling modes to maximize their own interests.(2) In this paper, the model of the differential pricing strategies of the CLSC for third-party recycling in separated recycling based on the difference between sales price of remanufactured electronic products and new electronic products, and difference of the recycling price of waste products. At the same time, by taking government subsidy as an incentive function into account this model. We use the method of game theory to study the differential pricing strategy, contract coordination problem and the effect of government subsidy on the CLSC. The optimal differential pricing strategy of the CLSC under centralized and decentralized decision making is discussed, and the correspondent profit is further compared. It is found that, in the case of non-cooperative game, the CLSC system cannot be optimally operated. The results show that the improved franchise contract can be able to achieve perfect coordination of CLSC. The decision analysis is used to verify its theoretical correctness and validity of contract design. It shows that government subsidy can be able to improve the enthusiasm of electronic product manufacturers to recycle waste electronic products, and increase the total profit of CLSC system.