Supply Chain Coordination Of Solid Biomass Fuel Under Random Supply And Cyclical Demand

Under the circumstance of emphasis on the energy structure optimization and low-carbon economy, biomass energy, which is the clean and renewable energy, has gradually played an important role in the energy structure all over the world. As one of the main type of biomass fuel, the solid is easy to transport and has higher calorific value. And benefit from production technology development of cleaning energy and support of government financial policies, its industrialization degree has been strengthened. The coordination of biomass solid fuel will improve both the profit and efficiency for each participant.In this paper, we take solid biomass fuel as the objects, then a simple two stage supply chain consisting of a supplier and a producer as well as another one consisting of two different suppliers and one producer are separately built. Both the two supply chains consider the situation of random supply and cyclical demand. Combining mathematical modeling with field research, and on the basis of a Stackelberg game controlled by the producer, we design different types of contracts, then the profit functions are formulated to be compared with the integrated benchmark to evaluate the supply chain coordination efficiency of the contracts. In the one-to-one supply chain, it is found that the wholesale price contract with shortage penalty can coordinate the supply chain only when the producer occupies almost all the profit. While there are multiple suppliers, a combination of contracts in which the forester receives a "protection price and subsidy policy" contract and the intermediate buyer gets a "buyback and revenue sharing" contract can finally realize coordination. And as the leader, the producer can reallocate the whole profit between suppliers and himself by adjusting the order quantity and contract terms.