Low-Carbonization Game Analysis And Optimization In A Two-Echelon Supply Chain Under The Carbon-Tax Policy

Based on the carbon-tax policy, with the consideration of consumers’ low-carbon preferences, this paper compares the pricing, emission reducing and advertising decisions in a centralized game, a decentralized Stackelberg game when manufacturer makes the first decision,a decentralized Nash game when manufacturer and retailer make decisions at the same time, and a decentralized Stackelberg game when retailer makes the first decision. This paper concludes that, through centralized game, namely, cooperation game, manufacturer, retailer and consumers can reach their optimal situation. And manufacturer’s emission reduction rate increases when carbon tax rate and consumers’ low-carbon preferences increase. By using the Nash bargaining model, with the introduction of the bargaining power and risk aversion degree of the two parties,this study provides a solution for the distribution of the additional profit when they cooperate. In numerical simulation section, this paper concludes that manufacturer and retailer can use centralized decision contract to optimize their decisions. Supply chain profit decreases a little and emission reduction rate increases a lot when carbon tax rate increases. The above conclusions are useful for government to make reasonable carbon tax rate and are helpful for enterprises to make decisions.