Research Of Inefficient In China's Environmental Regulation And Governance Path—Based On Analysis Of Collusion

Review of China's economic development in recent decades,1992 to 2010,China's GDP maintained an average annual growth rate of 10%of the high-speed level,and create a miracle of economics growth in the worldwide.Although the economics growth rate of China have decline after 2011 years,it steal higher than the level of 7%.But with the fast growth of GDP,the scarcity of resource has been revealed,and the pollution is getting worse.This shows that the previous resource utilization patterns of rough bring economic growth is not sustainableIn the process of writing,the first article is descriptive analysis about the existing situation of environmental pollution.In the analysis we show that the situation of pollution of water in China is steal very serious.The main reason of this may be water pollution is classified as river basin pollution,and the externalities is large.So the Local governments lack the incentive of pollution control.The externalities of urban air pollution is small,and local government have greater enthusiasm to control the pollution,but according to the new standard of urban air quality,the air quality of Beijing Tianjin are not reach the standard,the air pollution of this area are steal very severe.Deference from water pollution and air pollution,solid waste is greater recyclable.So the control effect of solid waste pollution in China is good.Consider the central government investment in pollution prevention and the overall situation environmental pollution in China's,We found that our environmental regulations are inefficient.The central government plays the role of macro-control in Environmental Regulation,the main actors in environmental policy are steal local government.In the analysis of the reason of environmental regulations inefficient in China,taking into account the local government is a rational economic man,it is easily captured by enterprises in the process of policy implementation.Therefore,this article analyzed contact between environmental regulation inefficient and collusion.Based on the assumption that the central government is the basis of benevolent government,local government and enterprises are rational economic man,we build a game analysis,and did come up the conclusion of that in the central government to local governments and enterprises to effectively monitor corporate sewage or excessive punishment without severe cases,local governments and enterprises easy collusion occurred.In this paper,as one after the turn of public stakeholder environmental regulation game model is introduced,when polluting enterprises,the public interest will be undermined,and the more intense public awareness of environmental protection,the more sensitive to his excessive emissions of pollution.In order to protect their own interests will not be damaged,the transmission of information at lower costs in the case of public will choose to pass information to the central government,then the probability of effective supervision of the central government to local governments and businesses will be.Therefore,the central government should be clear channels of information,and conduct environmental publicity to the public to raise public environmental awarenessThis article also collected eight years data of 27 provinces,on the base of this we do a panel analysis,then we found that the affect of collusion between local government and enterprises in Environmental Regulation Efficiency is remarkable,in addition;focus of high-energy companies and advanced technology markets also have some influence on Environmental Regulation Efficiency.In order to improve the efficiency of environmental regulation,the central government should put severely punished to the local government when deal with the collusion behavior.In industrial restructuring,the central government should increase investment and encourage the use of clean energy and give the enterprises subsidies for emissions control technology innovation,to encourage enterprises to increase investment in research and development funds of technology innovation.