Research On The Collusion Of Government And Enterprise In Environmental Regulation And Its Preventive Mechanism

The environmental management departments have used environmental regulation to reduce China's environmental pollution at a certain extent,however,China still face a very serious ecological environment problems,the high cost of prevention and health damage,loss of productivity,social conflicts and natural disasters cause by the problem has directly affected the healthy and sustainable development of society,economy,culture and ecological diversity.For a long time,my country's environmental protection policies and measures have been more emphasis on the "top down" government unitary governance model.In the dual role of economic decentralization and political centralization,local governments often form a community of interests through corporate with enterprises,the community is used as the "umbrella" for the polluting enterprises,or allow local enterprises to discharge pollution.In fact,from the environmental pollution event exposed by the media,I can find collusion between local governments and enterprises in our country is commo n phenomenon,collusion belong to non productive behavior,result in inefficient allocation of resources,and also exacerbate environmental pollution.Therefore,there is a great significance of studying the collusion between local governments and enterprises to improve the effectiveness of local government environmental regulation and improve regional environmental quality.Therefore,the paper takes the characteristics of China's decentralization syste m as the breakthrough point,and the thought of the research is from the analysis of the cause of formation to the analysis of the evolution law to the contract and prevention research.First of all,the paper analyzes the causes of the collusion between local governments and enterprises in e nvironmental regulation,and studies the key factors from the static perspective;Then,the evolutionary game theory is used to study the evolution rules of collusion between the relevant departments and enterprises;Then,on the basis of static analysis a nd dynamic analysis,the paper studies the defense contract of preventing the collusion between local governments and enterprises;Finally,according to the results of this model,we get the following conclusions:(1)From the perspective of the formation of collusion between government and enterprises,I can find the cost of pollution control,the probability of discovery of collusion between local governments and enterprises,and the expected loss after the discovery of local government and corporate collusion have a significant impact o n the formation and evolution of conspiracy.(2)From the perspective of evolution of collusion between government and enterprises,I can find the cost of pollution abatement,the probability of collusion to be found between local government departments and enterprises and the loss of collusion have a significant impact on the formation and evolution of conspiracy.The central government should reduce the cost and loss of pollution control,the probability of collusion to be found,which promote the stability of local government departments and enterprises in the behavior of the strategy(not collusion,collusion).(3)From the prevention of collusion between local governments and enterprises,I can find the punishment,subsidies,media supervision,and the inspection of the central environmental protection inspection center have a significant impact on collusion prevention strategy.It needs to attention that when applying the above regulatory tools to local governments in different regions,the government should give the targeted implementation of regulation according to the different areas,which can get better preventive effect.The specific methods are as follows:(1)On the point of penalty,the higher probability of the checkment from central inspection center,the smaller of the appropriate punishment appropriately.Ex post punishment is not affected by other factors,mainly for administrative penalty.(2)On the point of subsidies,the subsidy has negative correlation with the punishment,and has a positive correlation with the pollution abatement cost of the enterprise,and has media public supervision negative correlation with media public supervision.(3)On the point of examination mechanism,there is a positive correlation between the weight of assessment of the economic growth and punishment,the efficiency of media public supervision.(4)On the point of inspection,when the probability is higher,the total social welfare has a negative correlation with the probability of the central government,which indicates excessive examination will damage the optimal social welfare.(4)It is need to consider the economic and social development,when preventing the collusion.Excessive supervision will damage the optimal social welfare.Complete collusion prevention,the resulting costs and losses are often higher than part of the benefits that are not even preventive.The conclusion also explains why the central government is not always regulated the collusion in the environmental,and explains the causes of ecological pollution in China's economic development in the past.So it is need to combine the real social conditions to determine the effort of preventing collusion.