Research On Environmental Regulation Efficiency Of China From Fiscal Decentralization Perspective Based On Four Stage Window-DEA Method

Since the reform of Tax-share system,local governments have larger incentive for economic development and China has made great achievements in economic development.By the year of 2010,the GDP of china has exceeded Japan,which made china as the world’s second largest economy.While with the rapid development of economy,the environmental problem increases prominently,severely restricting the rational utilization and effective protection of resources and environment.Due to the public goods attribute of environment and the positive externality of the environmental government behavior,the government should conduct environmental regulation.Environmental regulation refers that government administrative department use environmental regulation tools to conduct the behavior of the enterprise or individual,which is related to environment.By adopting the combination of normative analysis and empirical analysis research methods,based on theory of public product and institutional economics,this paper focus on the research of environmental regulation efficiency in China.First,based on theoretical background this paper analyzed the environmental behavior of the parties under the perspective of fiscal decentralization,and then put forward research hypotheses.Second,the four stage Window-DEA model was built in order to accurately measure the inter-temporal environmental regulation efficiency and its influencing factors.Last,the empirical study of environmental regulation efficiency of China was carried on,to analyze the differences between the provinces on environmental regulation efficiency,and to test hypothesis.The main research conclusion is as follows:(1)under the unique system of Chinese fiscal decentralization,local officials would compete around the economic growth,even in cost of environmental pollution.In sake of own interests,the enterprises would probably ally with local officials through rent seeking,in order to lower the standard of environmental regulation.The pubic could not move away from the community that do poor in the governance of environment through the way of “vote with foot”.Only by protests and complaints supervision,could they bring the local officials to bear on the governance of environment.(2)Before eliminating the environmental factors,the environmental regulation efficiency fluctuates about 0.85 and distributes the pattern of “centre>east>west”,what is more,the environmental regulation efficiency shows big difference among different provinces.Before eliminating the environmental factors and random factors,the environmental regulation efficiency fluctuates about 0.66 and distributes the pattern of “east>centre>west”,while the environmental regulation efficiency still shows big difference among provinces.(3)The environmental factors and random factors have a significant impact on environmental regulation input slack variables.Local economic development level is negatively related to the human input and material input slack variables,while positively related to the financial input slack variables.Industry structure has a positive relationship with all the three input slack variables.FDI index has a positive relationship with the human input and material input slack variables,while has a negative relationship with the financial input slack variables.The population density only has a negative relationship with the material input slack variables.The marketization level only has a negative relationship with the human input slack variables.(4)No matter in national level,or the level of different regions,fiscal decentralization and regional corruption is negatively related with the environmental regulation efficiency,while public supervision only improves the environmental regulation efficiency of eastern region.Finally,according to the research conclusion of the paper,some policy suggestions are put forward to improve environmental regulation efficiency in China.