| Follow the "property right analysis--the construction of the game--the system design--game equilibrium",first of all,the author analyzes the theoretical perspective of the new institutional economics and constructs the theoretical framework of this paper,and assumes that with the help of the new institutional economics,it can be a more thorough analysis of the economic driving force behindthe transformation of urban industrial park.Secondly,the paper analyzes the essence of the transformation of the industrial park in the city,and thinks that the essence is the reconstruction and optimization of property with the game of the various subjects in the park,furthermore,the paper analyzes the change and game of the property rights subject from the increment to the stock background,and puts forward that the expansion of the land system and the status of property rights in the past,often bring huge transaction costs in the transformation of the stock,hindering the main players in the industrial park to achieve the game balance.Thirdly,from the perspective of the new institutional economics and the analysis method of game theory,the thesis focuses on the core of the game of property rights and analyzes the game strategy and game relationship among the government,the original property owner and the new owner of the property right to construct three industrial park transformation modes and game models according to the choice of the transition strategy and the regional difference of the government and the market in different regions.Finally,according to the cost and benefit of the transformation of multiple subjects in different game models,the innovation of industrial park and land system will be proposed to reconstruct the state of property rights,to internalize the transaction cost in the transformation,and to find a new starting point for the transformation of the industrial park to balance the interests of multiple subjects.The article is organized as follows:The first chapter is preface,based on the background of the transition of China's urban industrial park in the transition period,the introduction of property rights as the background of the stock market has become the core of the interests of the game in the transformation of the industrial park.It analyzes the phenomenon and difficulties of the transformation of the urban industrial park in the context of incremental access to stock,clarifies the significance of the research,defines the relevant concepts,and summarizes the research ideas and methods.The second chapter is an analysis of the essence and dilemma of the transformation of urban industrial park from the perspective of New Institutional Economics.From the perspective of the new institutional economics,this chapter puts forward that the essence of the transformation of the urban industrial park is the game of property rights and the optimization of the interests of the park.The author thinks that the existing incremental system brings the plight for the transformation,whether it is the property right system of the land development in the park or the model of the park management,it brings the huge transaction cost for the renewal of the urban industrial park.On the one hand,the continuation of the property right system of the land development in the park has produced a great deal of transaction cost in the process of the two development of the land,on the other hand,facing the continuation of the government leading top to bottom land development and management mode,the stock of property scattered,and top-down land development mode means a process of multiple property transactions between a government and every single subject of property rights in order to promote the park transformation,and therefore it brings a lot of reconfiguration property transaction cost.The third chapter is the game of multi subject interests in the transformation of urban industrial park.The author analyzes the core of the space game in the transformation,means property rights,and build a multi player game matrix relationship from the main characteristics of the parties and the main players'game strategy.Local government should be a public and economic role,for the original property owners,the fundamental purpose of their participation in the game is to be able to obtain maximum economic benefits in their property rights as well as the market subject.The fourth chapter is the construction of urban industrial park transformation model and game model.On the basis of the analysis of the relationship between the game and the game theory,this chapter constructs three kinds of transformation modes,which are the government leading,the main body of the new market and the leading of the property owner.Through the abstraction and abstraction of game elements,the game model of three models is constructed,and the game conditions are analyzed and integrated.The fifth chapter is the system design and breakthrough of constructing game equilibrium.Based on the analysis of the dilemma of different game models,this chapter puts forward the need to reconstruct the property rights and governance model to promote the construction of game equilibrium under different modes.The author designs the system innovation as well as the system feasibility analysis to the three kinds of patterns,and has constructed the reverse force as well as guide transformation management frame.In view of the system design of the property rights of the main body of government,the market and the original property owner,the author believes that the essence of the design is to promote the rational flow of property rights,to achieve a balanced game.Therefore,industrial park transformation in the context of China,the author thinks that the reconstruction and optimization of allocation of property rights,can not simply rely on market forces,or always adhere to the government from top to bottom,but coordination,balance is needed in order to achieve the balance of the game.The sixth chapter is conclusion and discussion. |
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