Font Size: a A A

An Economic Analysis Of Collective Corruption

Posted on:2018-03-13Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L YuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2346330515492986Subject:Western economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the increase of anti-corruption efforts,more and more collective corruption surfaced.A large area of the spread of corruption created a vicious cycle of political ecology,curb collective corruption has become a pressing matter of the moment to improve the political ecology.Through the analysis of Jiujiang water conservancy department corruption case,it obtained the main cause of the formation of this corruption: water conservancy investment increased year by year provided the benefits of space;water conservancy project links and the nature of the large volume provided long-term complementary power cooperation opportunities for officials;The director of Municipal Water Conservancy Bureau joined the collective corruption led to the failure of supervision mechanism,so that more people participate in the collective corruption.And accordingly,more links in the project lead to the longer relationship among officials,officials tend to form a stable relationship between collusion.This paper uses the game theory to set up a single game and repeated game model of official interaction,found collusion equilibrium in single game is unstable,and the number of repeated game close to the infinite time,through the adoption of grim strategy to achieve the greater possibility of collusion.In addition,the game set the subordinate officials and senior officials of interactive.It showed that higher officials' protection ability is stronger and the higher officials pay more attention to the private benefits,the possibility of lower level officials and superior officials conspire more.If the higher officials were bribed,the superior supervision mechanism would be invalid;diffusion of collective corruption would be more serious.With the model analysis to conclude the collective corruption to explain the formation mechanism and diffusion:complementarities between officials with authority to carry out long-term cooperation is the formation mechanism of collective corruption,at the same time higher officials have a significant influence on the spread of collective corruption.Compared with other studies,this paper joined the discussion of collective corruption diffusion in analyzing the formation of mechanism,theoretical research on collective corruption made the supplement to a certain extent,and the discovery is of great significance to the current governance of collective corruption.
Keywords/Search Tags:collective corruption, repeated game, formation mechanism, hierarchical diffusion
PDF Full Text Request
Related items