Research On The Formation Mechanism And Cooperative Strategies Of International Climate Agreement

Climate agreement is an important mechanism to ensure that all governments work together to cope with climate change.Inadequate incentives to reduce emissions and share responsibility disputes make it difficult to reach a consensus on climate agreement.International climate negotiations have also become the main battlefield for governments.Based on game theory,this dissertation discusses the formation mechanism of climate agreement and the cooperation strategies of negotiators on climate issues.First,discuss the design of the optimal climate agreement.By two-stage stochastic cartel formation game,discuss the conditions under which climate coalitions are formed,determine the optimal emission reduction commitments of countries within the coalition,and propose the draft agreement design.Second,focus on the negotiation process.Construct a negotiation network with scale-free features,based on which simulate the negotiation game between low-emission countries,analyze the evolution of cooperative strategy and discuss the influence of "Cooperation and Win-Win","Free-riding Negative Utility" and "Free-riding Free Welfare" on cooperative strategy convergence.Third,using the Steinberg game,study international cooperation on emission reduction under bilateral climate negotiations.The main conclusions of this dissertation are as follows: risk aversion reduces negotiators’ willingness to reduce emissions;low emission reduction costs and low emission reduction responsibility,is conducive for negotiators to accept climate agreement and form a climate coalition;duty factors and cost factors are not conducive to the formation of alliances,and comparing the two factors,cost factor is more influential;external stability impedes the formation of major coalitions;the transfer program is conducive to the expansion of the optimal coalition and can stimulate high-cost high-emission countries to join the climate agreement;high environmental benefit is conducive to expanding coalition,and especially under the transfer program,an increase in one country’s return can improve the returns of other countries,which eventually attracts all countries to participate in cooperation;Low-income and low-emission countries can influence more countries to join the coalition and to make higher emission reduction commitments;Low emission countries as a whole have a great influence on global climate change;The "Free-riding Negative Utility" has a stronger impact on the breakdown of the negotiations than "Free-riding Free Welfare".According to the research results,from the points of the design of climate agreement,the incentive measures for the promotion of agreement,and the enhancement of international cooperation,the dissertation puts forward corresponding policy suggestions.