Study On The Dominant Incentive To Prevent The Loss Of High Quality Junior Officers

In this paper,we use the theory of information and incentive economics,in the two aspects of reality and theory,in order to influence the military officers serving as the dominant incentive factor,the problem of the loss of high quality junior officers were analyzed.At the theoretical level,this paper uses the theoretical framework of economics of information and incentives,the officer corps abstracted with high and low ability of two officers and officers as private information not for the army informed,the lack of information screening mechanism makes high and low quality of officers to occur pooling equilibrium,contused qualified military personnel's enthusiasm,causing loss of officer of adverse selection.Subsequently,this paper uses the military officer professional behavior model,the work performance criteria,the level of wages,the promotion probability,the competition scale,the promotion ratio and the external factor and other explicit incentive factors,which,from the theoretical research on the service behavior of officers.Finally,for the problem of difficult to identify the ability of military officers,the performance bonus and the two stage of the two stages of the identification of the ability to identify the quality of the signal display mechanism.