Study On Matching Mechanism Of Public Rental Housing Based On Experimental Economics

Public rental housing is an important affordable housing project in our country,which has become a principle part in our housing guarantee system since issuing the notice of "joint operation".They are now in a phase of being allocated on a large scale.Even though the government has presented policy provisions aimed to improving the welfare level of applicants through public rental housing allocation,there still exists some problems in the actual allocation process,especially in the segment of physical allocation.Public rental housing refers to matching our government with all waiting members.The thesis will focus on how to efficiently allocate vacant and concentrated public rental housing among demanders by choosing an appropriate matching mechanism.Public rental housing matching is a bilateral matching market composed by the government and waiting members.According to some public rental housing administrative measures and enforcement regulations,the priority sequence of waiting members are decided by random lottery or comprehensive scores,and then waiting members choose houses following their priority sequence.The whole matching is dominated by the government and requires significant time and energy of all participants attributed to an incomplete information environment.Instead of improving the welfare level,this matching mechanism even leads to enormous waste of resources.Based on some experimental studies on bilateral matching markets,such as practice residency,school choice,dormitory matching,the thesis introduces Gale-Shapley and top trading cycle matching mechanism and compare them with the prevailing one in our country through experiments.Firstly,point out some prime problems in our prevailing matching mechanism on the premise of brief description of public rental housing allocation process,and illustrates methods of experimental economics and announcements in experimental design.Secondly,describe theoretical models of three matching mechanisms adopted in our experiment,including the prevailing one and the new two.Eventually,under an incomplete information environment,compare three matching mechanisms through the simulation of public rental housing matching experiments.Then compare and analyze experimental results by using the expression of true preferences and welfare index.The conclusion is that two new matching mechanisms are better than the existing one,especially the top trading cycle matching mechanism,which can provide some references and suggestions with the improvement of our current public rental housing matching mechanism.