Research On The Rules And Regulations Of Public Rental Housing Management

Since the concept of public housing was proposed for the first time in 2009,our country's public housing construction has developed rapidly.The affordable housing system has also been continually improved,and the multi-level housing security system has been basically established.Because of the economic and social development restrictions,the public housing system in China still confronts many problems.The thesis has carried on deep research and discussion of several challenging problems facing the government,which has important theoretical and practical value to improve the public housing security system and to add social welfare effect of affordable housing.Based on the current state of public housing in our country,the state of the art of researches at home and abroad and the experience of developed countries,the thesis applies the field study to analyze the three key problems,that is determining the optimal quantity,discrimination pricing mechanism and regulatory game of exiting channel,according to the problems existing in the construction of public housing in our country.The thesis introduces the queuing theory to public housing rent supply system,establishes the supply decision-making model aimed at maximizing social welfare effect,and obtains the corresponding optimal supply quantity.Through the data comparison,the social effect of the rent service is analyzed.The thesis analyzes of regulation pricing model in economics from cost pricing,price discrimination,profit upper bound pricing,price upper bound pricing,and analyzes all the factors impacting the public rental prices.The conclusions that pricing of public housing should balance reasonable costs and yields in discrimination pricing model are drawn from the perspective of encouraging market investment,reducing the pressure of government finance,and social security and social welfare.At last,the overwhelming role of the government in pricing of public housing is summarized.The thesis analyzes the current exit mechanism of public housing in our country,divides the participants in the public housing exit game into four categories,they are legal renewal tenants,legal non-renewal tenants,illegal tenants and no-entry tenants,and analyzes the relations between government and four categories of participants in the public housing.By introducing game model into public housing exit mechanism,the government can utilize the incentive and punishment measures to promote efficient recycling of the public housing.