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Reasonable Fare And Subsidy Mode For P&R Located At Metro Station In Beijing

Posted on:2018-03-01Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L J ChenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330512493059Subject:Road and Railway Engineering
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With the rising number of vehicles,traffic congestion and environmental degradation has become an important factor restricting the development of traffic.P&R(Park and Ride,hereinafter referred to as P&R)played a role can not be underestimated in the interception of the passenger flow into the main city,ease the morning and evening peak congestion problem.Compared with foreign countries,domestic P&R research started late,the construction mechanism is not perfect,the lack of scientific planning and fare management mechanism.Therefore,how to develop a reasonable fare under the premise of further development of P&R,the establishment of a sound mechanism of subsidies has become an urgent problem to be solved.The following research work is carried out in this paperIn this paper,based on the analysis of domestic and foreign P&R facility pricing methods,the P&R pricing model is established:In this paper,based on the pricing mechanism of P&R,the applicability of P&R pricing in solving traffic problems and guiding passengers' travel behavior is analyzed.Through the analysis of the user needs of P&R,three P&R pricing models of the participants in the P&R are established,Finally,a bi level programming model is established to satisfy the above three participants,the upper level is the P&R pricing model for the government to achieve the maximization of social benefits that considering the operating efficiency of enterprises,and the lower level is the P&R user choice behavior model.The dynamic programming equation is established by the enumeration method,and the social benefit value matrix of P&R and the destination parking price is obtained.Based on the analysis of the government's explicit and implicit subsidies to P&R enterprises,this paper focuses on the role of incentive subsidies.,In this paper a principal-agent model of government and enterprise is established,which is based on the P&R enterprise's effort level,and the incentive allowance under the condition of information symmetry and information asymmetry are analyzed;On the basis of the above model,the government's supervision mechanism is introduced,based on the analysis of the relationship between the fare income and the effort level of P&R enterprises,the optimal subsidy model is established;This paper analyzes the factors that affect the level of effort,and establishes the evaluation system of incentive effect of P&R financial subsidy,which Provides the calculation basis for the government to measure the degree of effort of P&R Enterprises.In this paper,three P&R located of Anheqiao North Station in Beijing Metro Line 4 are taken as the object,the statistical data are analyzed,the parameters are calibrated,and the modified objective function is obtained,and the fare matrix is obtained by the enumeration method;P&R fare,destination parking fare and social benefits in the case of considering the situation of financial subsidies are analyzed,refinement of government subsidies under the conditions of the fare matrix to obtain the best social fare P&R is 8.5 yuan per berth per day;By calculating the annual operating cost of the P&R located of Anheqiao North Station,the government fixed subsidy amount under the P&R optimal fare and the amount of the government incentive allowance when the social benefit is the largest is 5.9 yuan per berth per day.
Keywords/Search Tags:Park and ride, fare, subsidy, game theory, principal agent theory, incentive subsidy
PDF Full Text Request
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