Research On B2C Platform Operation Model And Incentive Mechanism Under Product Information Asymmetry

With the beginning of the Internet time,more and more trading activities took place in online,the transaction of the Internet platform has become a trading party to carry out online trading carrier.In contrast to the past,before the Internet has not been so popular,daily shopping,living expenses and other activities to face-to-face transactions mainly under the offline.But with the times brought about by the change,many traditional payment activities gradually turn to online transactions.Similar to Tmall,JD and other B2C model(business to customer)platform has gradually become an important way to business with user transactions.With the growing size of online transactions and the expand of B2C's model,the proportion of online shopping from the early single price advantage gradually into both price and quality.On the one hand,the externalities provided by the platform make the users involved in the impact of other users,on the other hand,the scale of the expansion also exacerbated the possible information asymmetry.With the increase in consumer purchasing power,the focus on product quality is also significantly higher than before.The article mainly wants to study the platform operators in the network environment,in the face of the existence of product information asymmetry in the case of business model selection and for different business models to take the incentive measures.Because of the existence of product quality information asymmetry problems,platform operators in the actual operation will face in the face of the model choice.At the same time,when the platform operators choose different models,the variables for their decision-making and decision-making are different and need to be targeted to the seller(and the product supplier)in different situations.This paper mainly analyzes the incentive strategies of platform operators when choosing different business models by considering the asymmetry of quality information in the products sold in the platform.It is hoped that by comparing the differences and links between different operators,we will analyze the differences between the platform operators and the platform operators.When the platform operators choose the platform type business model,the product suppliers will have the product quality information while their marketing efforts cannot be supervised.The incentive strategy chosen by the business.At the same time,when the platform operators choose their own business model,the face of product suppliers to master the full quality of information,the need for its supply of different quality levels of products for certain incentives,so that it tells their own products Of the real information,so as to achieve the purpose of maximizing profit margins.In this paper,the author points out that the platform operators need to face the choice of business model under the condition of information asymmetry.Under the condition that the product quality information,scale factor and pricing information are known,the proportion of high quality products and the different cost of platform supervision has an influence on the mode choice of platform operators,and also affects the corresponding optimal incentive strategy selection.The main conclusions are as follows:(1)Under the optimal contract of the platform type operation mode,the suppliers of different quality levels will choose the corresponding contract according to their product quality and carry out reasonable marketing activities according to the product quality,and the platform operator can reach Its profits to maximize.For the analysis of different types of product quality,it can be concluded that the quality of the low quality product is not related to the optimal contract developed by the platform operator for the seller of the high quality product,and has no influence on the distribution coefficient.(2)Under the optimal contract of self-operated mode,suppliers of different quality levels will inform the platform operators themselves according to their own product quality.The platform operators will then carry out marketing activities according to the quality of their reported products,and finally reach the maximum profit The purpose of the.For high-quality product suppliers,the higher the quality level of their own income will increase,while the level of low-quality products increased,will make high-quality supplier gains damage.(3)When the platform operators face two business model choices,through the numerical simulation analysis of the platform under the supervision of a certain cost factor,with the market in the proportion of high-quality products increased,the platform operators choose self-mode income Will gradually increase.When the proportion of high-quality products in the market exceeds a certain value,the platform operators will turn to select the self-employed business model,and will increase with the proportion of high-quality products and the benefits of further widening.