The Impact Of Ownership Structure On The Behavior Of Major Shareholders Of Listed Companies In China

Equity concentration and major shareholders have become the trend of corporate governance.The major shareholders play an important role in the company.This paper will study the influence of ownership structure on the behavior of Listed Companies' large shareholders in China.In this paper,we will not only discuss large shareholders' tunneling behavior,but also analysis the governance supervision and management behavior that large shareholders do in the corporate.From the analysis of this paper,the existence of large shareholders can overcome the problem of shareholders' free rider in the widely dispersed ownership.They can take part in corporate governance and avoid the problem of information symmetry.Through the supervision and management,the large shareholders can improve company operating efficiency and improve the value of the company.But on the other hand,the major shareholder have a relative or absolute control of the company,so that large shareholders prefer to pursue private benefits of control and tunnel the listed companies,and all shareholders have to bear the cost.How to restrain the tunneling behavior of large shareholders?From the LLSV model,investor protection mechanism can restrain the behavior of large shareholders,fundamentally protect the minor shareholders' confidence in investment,promote the prosperity and development of the securities market;In the case of perfect legal system,the ownership balance mechanism can suppress the tunneling behavior of large shareholders and enhance the value of the company.According to the principal-agent theory,shareholders and corporate leaders form the principal-agent relationship.The large shareholders can supervise the leaders' behavior,but large shareholders'tunneling behaviors occupied the interests of minority shareholders.If the small and medium-sized shareholders can act as a principal agent for effective control the behavior of large shareholders,their own welfare loss can be controlled in a certain range and they can inhabit the controlling shareholder's tunneling behavior of.However,in the absence of an effective investor protection mechanism in China,the illegal cost for large shareholders to harm minority shareholders is relatively small.Large shareholders do not actively supervise the managers to reduce the agency costs.Highly concentrated ownership also facilitates the major shareholders' tunneling behavior.It is a serious problem that the capital occupation harms the value of the company and the interests of small shareholders in China.In the absence of investor protection system,the interests of minority shareholders can't be effectively and timely protected.At the same time,in China's listed companies,the degree of the balance of shares is very low.So,it is difficult to really check and balance of the major shareholders' behaviors.Sometimes,large shareholders collude with each other to transfer corporate assets.Through the results of the empirical testing,it can't restrain the tunneling behavior and has a bad effect on improving the value of the company when the largest shareholder is too concentrated or too dispersed.Only when the largest shareholder maintains interval relative holdings,the largest shareholders actively participate in corporate governance and reduce agency cost,reduce the extent of tunneling of listed companies,and promote the improvement of corporate value.At present,China's equity balance degree is not high enough,but it,to some extent,reduces the agency cost of listed companies.However,because the equity balance degree is too low,it can't reduce the tunneling behavior of the large shareholder.So,the Balance Mechanism is not significant in the aspects of reducing corporate value.It is worth noting that,in China,the more the second largest shareholder has proportion of listed companies,the lower the company value is.So,the best ownership structure is that when the proportion of the first largest shareholder in the 30%-50%range and the second largest shareholder can't affect the control of the largest shareholder,and form a mutual joint ownership structure to balance the largest shareholder's behaviors.So,this paper puts forward the following opinions to improve the ownership structure of Listed Companies and change the behavior of large shareholder better in China:to build a reasonable and effective equity balance degree;the shareholding ratio of the large shareholder is not too low and not too high;to build an effective supervision,perfecting laws and regulations in our country;to increase the punishment on the tunneling behavior of large shareholders;to establish small and medium-sized investment protection mechanism;to promote the right of speaking of the small and medium shareholders;to improve the interests of small shareholders,so that medium and small shareholders can reasonably use their vote to protect themselves and the interests of the company.