Distribution Of The Land Transfer Payments Under Revenue Sharing Perspective

State Council Circular on deepening the reform of income distribution in 2013 is required to improve the state-owned land transfer mechanism,establish and improve public resource transfer revenue universal sharing mechanism,visible around the reform of land system and income distribution mechanism has become the strategic decision-making center of decision-making.In this study,revenue sharing Perspective,land transfer for the study,investigate land transfer formation mechanism and Stakeholders land leasing assignment involved clarify the theoretical and practical basis of land transfer income distribution for the realization of land revenue sharing provide a scientific basis and policy recommendations.The first chapter is the introduction,including research background and meaning,purpose and content,research methods and technical route,lack of innovation and research,and the research objectives of this paper land transfer,land transfer revenue,land revenue etc.define the concept.The second chapter is the literature review and theoretical basis,first introduced the research status at home and abroad on the land transfer revenue sharing for this research to find a new perspective and direction,and then set forth herein related theory:the theory of property rights;land value-added income distribution theory;Rawls' theory of distributive justice;game theory;agency theory.Chapter connotation and status of the land revenue sharing.First theory,based on the theory of land ownership,land value-added income distribution theory,Rawls' theory of distributive justice,clarify land revenue sharing should be pursued between central and local,fair and local farmers,rural and urban,and between generations.In practice,combing central policy towards land revenue sharing developed by combining empirical data to understand the local government's implementation of the policy,comparison found deviation central policy and local practice room and found the current transfer revenue sharing mechanism land problems:local turned over to the central ratio is too low;the land transfer income farmers ratio is too low;the proportion of land transfer income in rural agricultural expenditure is too low;the land transfer retention ratio is too low.The fourth chapter is to analyze the behavior of different stakeholders on the land transfer revenue sharing mechanism extent.Combined with game theory,principal-agent theory interests action strategy analysis,land property rights theory and other stakeholders to take the land revenue allocation,and the resulting impact on income distribution and summarize stakeholder status,values and policy arrangements and other individual characteristics affect the intrinsic value of the income distribution,revealing the formation mechanism of the land transfer revenue sharing degree.Local government is the central government agent,both having principal-agent relationship.In the case of asymmetric information,the principal(the central government)are not able to accurately grasp the agent(local government)behavior,the asymmetry of information will encourage local authorities to act against the Central Government's intention to pursue their own interests regardless of the overall interests of the improper behavior.According to public choice theory and government failure to control a monopoly on government officials with certain privileges on the market and use it for personal gain theoretical assumptions.Due to performance evaluation and incentive tax reform and local land transfer process,with the central objective of income earnings targets local governments have had a bias,leading to local and central game.Strategies will place the violation took place,when a lower compliance costs,higher yields when local irregularities,the local government will be in the game and in the center of the dominant,will occupy the center of interest in the initial distribution,while in redistribution contrary to the wishes of the center,resulting in low levels of state revenue sharing,triggering a series of social problems.Since agricultural land property rights fuzzy,incomplete property rights,leading to farmers and the government position on the land transfer income inequality,both in the game,when the local illegal low cost,high cost of rights of farmers,the local government will with farmers dominated the game,the peasants occupied land revenue,resulting in low levels of revenue sharing.The fifth chapter is to promote policy research land revenue sharing.With revenue sharing targeted improvement programs proposed land transfer income distribution mechanism.Game optimization system from the outside point of view,policy reform from five aspects:the reform of taxation;performance appraisal system reform;land property rights system reform;Compensation System Reform;Legal Supervision System.From the perspective of game equilibrium optimization can start from four directions:to improve local compliance costs(improve the supervision system);reduce local illegal income(the rational allocation of land transfer income and complete ownership of agricultural land);reduced central oversight costs(use of relevant indicators as a performance evaluation in order to stimulate local reference);reduce farmers' cost of rights(prosecution system).Considering the game outside the game equilibrium system optimization and optimization of the direction of reform,policy reform proposals given by the author are:the reform of taxation system;improved performance appraisal system;improve the land property rights system;the reform of the land expropriation system;sound monitoring system;the reform of land transfer distribution system.