Research On The Segmentation Of Fishing Rights And The Behavior Choice Of Fishermen Under The Background Of Maritime Sovereignty Game

The United Nations Convention on the law of the sea,the signed of agreement on fisheries by China and South Korea,China and Japan,China and Vietnam,The fishing rights of fishermen in our traditional fishing areas are limited.The sea area between China and other countries is divided into a number of small range of waters,Such as the waters between China and South Korea is divided into Tentative Measures of water,transitional waters,etc..The traditional fishing rights of fishermen are divided into several small rights,In the specific waters,our fishermen have a right bundle consisting of one or more rights and enjoy different rights in different waters,for example,fishermen in interim measures only enjoy the Right of access,extraction and part of management,In this paper,this phenomenon is defined as the segmentation of fishing rights.The fishery management policies in our country include fishing license system,quantity control system,management system and so on,different subjects have different rights,For example,under the management system,Private fishing right enjoy the constraint right to access,extraction and management;Common fishery right enjoy the constraint right to access and extract;Club fishing right enjoy the constraint right to access,extract and transfer.This paper summarizes the situation of the segmentation of fishing rights under different restraint system in China.Through the analysis of the impact of the fishing rights segmentation,the fishing cost,profit level and safety of fishermen are affected by it,for the basic production and life,the behavior of fishermen has changed.After a lot of investigation,Fishermen tends to balance the loss of fishery rights by illegal fishing,For example,fishing in the ban-fishing area,or the other country's exclusive economic zone etc..in this paper,the relationship between the fishermen and the government after lose part of fishery rights is simplified as a dynamic game process: formulate policies of government,changes behavior of fishermen,sovereignty regulation of government and the rational behavior of fishermen.Through the game tree,it is found that the unreasonable fishing behavior can improve the economic profit of fishermen and the sovereignty regulation by government can reduce collective loss.So,the last part of this paper compares domestic and foreign fishery policy,and put forward corresponding suggestions by the national condition and problems of China,In order to achieving a win-win situation for fishermen and the collective,restricting the unreasonable fishing behavior of fishermen,reducing the conflicts with other countries,and realizing the sustainable development of marine resources in China.