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Research On Operation Mechanism And Regulation Of Online Car-hailing Platforms

Posted on:2018-02-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W ZhaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2359330542451617Subject:Industrial Economics
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The popular of car-hailing apps brings the rapid development of online car-hailing platforms,which greatly facilitates the people's travel,improves the efficiency of the use of social resources,reduces the information asymmetry between the passengers and the driver.Moreover,it also breaks the traditional government regulation of the taxi industry.This paper first combs the relevant literature about traditional taxi industry,operation mechanism and regulation of online car-hailing platforms,which focuses on the analysis of the cross network externality,platform competition and pricing strategy.Then,the paper reference Mark Armstrong's two-sided competition model and establish the analysis model framework under the conditions of complete monopoly,oligopoly and competitive market.In addition,the different pricing strategy of different products in the oligopoly market and the social welfare analysis in different market Conditions were further explored in this paper.The conclusions are as follows:First,the platform market duopoly market is more efficient;Second,the results of profits maximization of monopoly market often have differentiated pricing in two-sided market.Third,there is a market failure in the competitive platform market,which can only achieve sub-optimal solution about number,pricing,etc.This paper have two case analysis about taxi-hailing service and tailored taxi service as empirical study.Case One:Didi has 99.8%market share of Chinese taxi-hailing market,which can be considered as a complete monopoly market.Through the model calculation,the total utility of the drivers is higher than the passengers,but the unit utility of passengers obtained from the driver is higher.the number of passengers and drivers have the greatest impact on the platform profit.Case Two:After the acquisition of Uber China,Didi have more than 90%market share,while Shenzhou only have 2.9%and Easy face the risk of delisting,the tailored taxi market can be approximated as a duopoly monopoly market.The conclusion is that the total utility of the passengers is higher than the drivers.the profit of Didi is greater than Shenzhou because Didi have more number of two-sided users.One side pricing of Oligopoly monopoly platform will be decrease due to the other side of the platform,which to increase the number of users and the profits also increase proportionally.Finally,this paper studies the regulation route of foreign online car-hailing platforms,combined with the current policy interpretation of online car-hailing platforms.We puts forward the four aspects regulation suggestions about entry regulation,quantity regulation,quality and safety regulation,fare regulation.The suggestions in order to Promote the standardization development of China's online car-hailing platforms.
Keywords/Search Tags:Online Car-Hailing Platforms, Cross Network Externality, Social Welfare Analysis, Regulation
PDF Full Text Request
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