Study On The Hybrid Modes Of Collective-Owned Construction Land Marketization

Along with the rapid urbanization and constrain on economic growth because of lack of urban construction land,as well as the requirement of adhering to the cultivated land red line and balancing rural and urban development,the reform of rural land institutions and establishment of a unified construction land market in rural and urban areas has finally been taken into consideration.Since the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC,the CPC Central Committee has put forward the strategic policy of land reform among which is to give admission to collective-owned construction land for entering the land market in the pilot areas.During the reform period,some pilot areas carried out the whole land reform in a coordinated way on the scale of the whole town or the area such as Daxing District in Beijing and Nanhai District in Guangdong Province,which seem to have a positive effect on integrating land resources,realizing land use scale effect and upgrading the local industry.Based on the discovery of the fact that different patterns of organizing this rural land reform in a coordinate way has emerged,this paper aim to reveal why different areas choose(or why they have to choose)different coordination patterns which is to explain what are the important factors that must be taken into account when deciding what patterns to choose,and then this paper will try to evaluate or compare the performances under different hybrid modes.Under the intention of through this collective mercantile construction land reform to realize similar rights and price of rural and urban construction land,give rural people the opportunity to share value-added land revenue and improve governance efficiency,this paper has put forward the theoretical hypothesis based on the Institutions of Sustainability(loS)framework and the Williamson Transaction Cost Economics(TCE)paradigm and then use the pilot case in typical areas for verificationTheoretical analysis shows that transaction attributes and characteristics of actors will influence the choice of governance structures and thus lead to different performances.Case study reveals that the higher the specificity of human capital,the uncertainty of transaction behavior and the complexity of transactions,the more government-led hybrid governance structure is tend to be adopted.The lower the specificity of material capital and the uncertainty of the transaction environment,the more collective-organization-led hybrid governance structure is tend to be adopted.In general,the smaller the number or size of actors in the market integration,the stronger the convergence of interests,the higher the degree of participation in democratic decision-making and the richer the social capital they possess,the more collective-organization-led hybrid governance structure is tend to be adopted.In terms of Xihongmen Town in Daxing District,villages collectively acquired shares of the land ownership as a land-asset joint venture company as the main entity for implementation of this reform,which fits the collective-organization-led hybrid governance structure.In terms of Guicheng street in Nanhai District,the main implementing entities for this land reform is the establishment of district-level and street-level collective land consolidation centers,which fits the government-led hybrid governance structure.Case analysis indicates that the governance structure in use are chosen based on the fitness of transaction attributes and characteristics of actors which fits the theoretical assumptions,but this fitness does not always mean the best and the performances under different hybrid modes can be compared from the perspective of resource use,income distribution,governance efficiency and external effects,which can be seen as a double check of governance fit.Judging from the current pilot conditions,it is more appropriate to adopt a hybrid governance structure led by collective organizations with government guidance and market participation,which is also the corresponding governance structure of in Daxing District where the street-level collective-owned construction land marketization is carried out.Based on theoretical analysis and case study,this paper puts forward corresponding policy suggestions from three aspects including adjustment of transaction attributes,choice of governance structure and improvement of governance performance.Finally,this paper also concludes the possible innovations and deficiencies need further study.