The Study About Effect Of Corporate Governance Structure On The Performance Of Chinese Real Estate Firms

In the 1990 s,the reform of state-owned enterprises in China kicked off.The concept of corporate governance was introduced into the Mainland to accelerate the process of market-oriented reforms.After years of efforts,most companies have established their own corporate governance structures in accordance with the framework of the modern enterprise system,but their performance has been showing mixed.So,what kind of corporate governance structure is conducive to improving corporate performance? Which governance structure factors are effectively combined can lead to high performance of the company? This study selected the real estate industry as a sample source.This article takes Shanghai-Shenzhen A shares of Chinese real estate listed companies as the research object,and combines the “Securities Industry Classification Guidelines for Listed Companies” and the “2017 Shenwan Industry Classification Table” released by the China Securities Regulatory Commission to screen out 145 initial research samples.Through the elimination of ST companies,B-share companies,companies that do not meet the above two categories of indicators at the same time,and companies with missing data,the remaining 99 Chinese real estate listed companies have become the sample companies of this study.Through the literature reading and data review,on the basis of previous research results,a corporate governance structure framework consisting of "ownership structure-board of directors governance structure-executive incentives" was devised,and in the aspect of ownership structure,two secondary indicators of "shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder,shareholding balance" are set.The two secondary indicators of “board size,proportion of independent directors” are set in the governance structure of the board ofdirectors;in the aspect of executive incentives,the “long-term incentives for senior executives use the number of shares held by senior executives”.For the short-term incentives of senior executives,“the top three executive compensation” is used Corporate performance as a result variable is expressed as ROE.The research method used in this paper is fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis method(fs QCA).The softwares used to process the data in this study are mainly SPSS and fs QCA2.0.After collection of data and sample,selection and calibration of variables,generation of truth tables,and analysis of the necessity and empirical results,the following conclusions are drawn:First,the Chinese real estate listed companies involved in this study mainly achieve high-performance paths through five types of structures.Among them,the two largest types cover the largest sample companies:(1)Equity checks and balances are good,board of directors is larger,and executives hold more shares;(2)The largest shareholder holds a large proportion of shares,the board of directors is relatively large,and the proportion of independent directors is relatively high.Secondly,with respect to the ownership structure,when the proportion of large shareholders holding shares is high,they can directly control the company and participate in the internal management of the company,which will help reduce the information asymmetry in the principal-agent relationship and improve the operating efficiency of the company.Supplementing with the right balance of other shareholders will help improve the overall performance of the company.Third,the degree of influence of the board structure on corporate performance is relatively small compared to ownership structure and executive incentives.In the configuration with the board structure as the core element,when the board of directors is relatively large and the proportion of independent directors is relatively high,the performance of real estate listed companies is higher.Fourth,as for executive incentives,In the four high-performance configurations with executive incentives as the core elements,the secondary indicators that appear are all “executive stocks held by senior executives” that represent the long-term equity incentives of senior executives,covering 83% of the sample size.It shows that in terms of incentive mechanism,equity incentive is the most important factor affecting corporate performance,while the short-term incentive mechanism represented by compensation is relatively weak.