An Empirical Study On Social Capital And Farmers' Lending Behavior

The dualistic opposition between urban and rural areas has constrained the improvement of China's economic and social levels,narrowing the gap between urban and rural areas,and accelerating rural construction has become a major problem that urgently needs to be resolved.While providing financial support for farmers and activating their potential for self-development is a top priority,due to the lack of collateral,farmers in rural areas are generally faced with the problem of difficult loans.The rural bank have continuously created more conditions for farmers to obtain loans through theGroup Lendingand Guarantee Lending in rural areas to use farmer's social capital.However,the problem has arisen.How can farmers cope with the increase in the difficulty of repaying loans obtained through social capital?In the village,the point chosen by the author,villagers practice their answers to this question with their own logic.In this paper,through the case study of Hai Village,we tried to answer some of the questions of the Hai Village Loan,that is,how villagers obtained high loans in Hai Village;how the use of loans caused repayment difficulties;and how the villagers were under the premise of repayment difficulties.Through the analysis,it was found that the villagers used the existing social capital to obtain an initial high loan.The main reason for the difficulties in repayment is due to the failure of high-risk,high-yield agricultural and livestock investment by villagers.In most villagers in the Hai village,the loan did not play a role in increasing their economic income instead became a burden on the villagers.In the case of self-payment difficulties,the villagers have also realized through their social capital complete the cycle of loans and repayment,to ensure that they can continue to obtain loans to maintain the stability of life.social capital played a support role to its continued borrowing.The reason why social capital can play a role is inseparable from the system.The guarantee system of rural bank makes institutional protection for social capital as a "collateral." However,while social capital guarantees villagers access to loans and development opportunities,it also spreads the risk to other actors linked to their interests,triggering tensions in social relations.